F.O.
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FOR THE
PUBLIC SERVICE

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1827/1

AMMAN Chancery
To Middle East Secretariat

No: 22201/2
Date. 14/1
Rec'd. 17/1

Economic Refugees.

Discusses the disadvantage of providing rations after the next harvest.

Cpd.) British Middle East Office, + Beirut.

Last Paper

References

EE18214/49 -1951
ET 1151/7

98516

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8) Col. Russell-Edmunds Treasury with EE18214/49 of 1951 26 Jan

MES

(Action completed) [signature] 21/2

(Index) [signature] 17/10

Next Paper

(Minutes)

I think that this is a reasonable request & that we should urge the Treasury to agree. We might discuss it with them at the proposed meeting. Meanwhile, this letter & the pp on EE18214/49 should be copied to Col. Russell-Edmonds, Treasury.

CWaterlow 23/1

Mr Hunter,
E. Dept.

Pl copy first & resubmit to me

[signature] 26.i

Pl see my minute on ET1151/7.

[signature] 28.i

× CW 21/2

37021

22201/2

CONFIDENTIAL

E

E 1827/1

British Legation,
Amman.

14th January 1952.

Dear Middle East Secretariat,

We have received your letter EE 18214/49 of 28th December 1951 on the subject of economic refugees.

2. The refusal of UNRWA to relieve these people springs, as you suggest, from a strong disinclination to take on further resettlement commitments rather than the difficulty of providing the food. The Jordan regional director, in fact, has propounded a way of providing food for the economic refugees without adding to the total relief bill by reducing by a little the monthly ration to all refugees. However natural this attitude may be, we cannot find it very far sighted. The resettlement difficulty will not vanish through not looking at it. Unless the political situation changes very radically and the frontier inhabitants are able to work once more on their lands and in the ports and citrus groves of Israel, a proportion of these people will have to find or be found work elsewhere, and UNRWA ought surely to take a hand in this.

3. We must add however, that in our view, giving rations to these needy people as economic refugees will result in taking away from them the will to find work for themselves elsewhere. At the moment, desperate need is driving them to look personally for work anywhere. From our own very narrow experience, it seems that more economic refugees are roving in search of employment than the rationed refugees, particularly than those refugees in the large camps. It is important in our view that this should continue, and that they should not be glued to their villages by ration registers and the removal of the spur of economic necessity. For this reason UNRWA is surely right in its reluctance to extend rations to them, but not for the reason that by giving rations the need for resettlement is acknowledged. Given the present political circumstance some resettlement will be inescapable.

4. Unfortunately last year's disastrous harvest both in cereals and olives has meant that hunger is pressing exceptionally heavily on the economic refugees, as also on the Jordanian poor in certain areas of Trans-Jordania. Wander as they will, there is not the work or food available as there might have been in a good year. It is thought that the present dangerous increase of infiltration on the Israeli frontier is a symptom of this distress. We feel, therefore, that there is a case for some aid to be given from now until the next harvest. This aid should, we suggest, not be given exclusively to the economic refugees, which might create the idea of an obligation by the United Nations to give indefinite relief for the economic refugees in the future. It should be a relief measure for all the afflicted areas, to stave off the worst distress resulting from the last bad harvest. In practice most of the aid should probably be sent to the frontier areas and the Jerusalem poor.

..../5.

Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
17 JAN 1952
SENT TO
22

5. The question remains as to who is to finance this temporary relief. There are about 68,000 economic refugees. UNRWA reckons $2 a month per refugee for full and $1 a month for half rations. This makes a total on half rations of $408,000 a half year, with a little extra for Trans-Jordanian poor. It had been expected that the Jordan Government would make a handsome profit on the coming shipload of 9,000 tons of American wheat. Now it is impossible to fix a figure for this owing to the falling price for wheat in the Jordan market. However you state in your letter Mr. Fritzlan's opinion that the United States Government may not insist on full payment of counterpart funds, and that a further shipload of 9,000 tons of wheat is being held in reserve. Such provisions would go far to cover the temporary need. But there will probably be an expectation on the American side that the United Kingdom should participate in this relief. In our view this could best be done by the release of the £50,000 requested for just such a purpose by the Jordan Government in its letter of acceptance of the £1.5 million loan (reference Amman despatch No.3). ET 1151/7

6. This combined Anglo-American relief should be sufficient for the present emergency, and by explaining the aid as a temporary relief measure for the poor harvest, no long term comitments are undertaken. However the time is short. The need is from now until July or August. We therefore recommend that the £50,000 be released without waiting for final agreement on the conditions for the expenditure of the loan as suggested in our despatch under reference.

7. We are sending copies of this letter to the Development Division of BMEO and to the Office of United Kingdom Advisory Commission to UNRWA in Beirut.

Yours ever,

Amman Chancery.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

1952

EE 1827/2.

Commercial Secretariat
Amman
to Middle East Secretariat
No 7
CS12801
D. 29th January
R. 8th February

Estimate of wheat supplies for economic refugees:-
States if free wheat is to be supplied probably a further 3 to 4000 tons would be required to cover the period until the next harvest.

Last Paper

References

ET1301/2.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes)

The extra 3-4000 tons will presumably have to be met out of our loan - though the Americans did indicate that they had a further shipload for Jordan in reserve.

Copy to Mr Couldrey, B. of Trade, & Mr D. G. Stewart, M. of Food.

EWaterlow
11/2

Mr Hunter
E-Dept

12/2

I should hope it would not be from the loan. It would probably take another £120.000 at least.

Jas Hunter
12.ii

EW 13/2

(Action completed)

13/2

(Index)

pa 284

Next Paper

37021

E

COMMERCIAL SECRETARIAT
BRITISH LEGATION
AMMAN

No.7
CS 12801
CONFIDENTIAL

29th January, 1952

EE 1824/2.

Dear Secretariat,

Please refer to paragraph 2 of your letter (ET 1301/2) of 15th January, 1952, about wheat supplies for the economic refugees.

The estimate given in Mayhew's letter to Couldrey was based amongst other things on present per capita rates of consumption which, amongst the economic refugees, is at the moment extremely low. If free wheat is to be distributed to them this per capita rate will of course increase immediately and probably a further 3 to 4000 tons of wheat would be required to provide free wheat to all the economic refugees until next harvest.

Yours ever,

COMMERCIAL SECRETARIAT

Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.R.
8 FEB 1952
SENT
9/2.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1827/3

"Jordan Border Village Poor"

U.N.I.C.E.F.

Comm'd.

Undated.

Rec'd. 6/3/52.

Extract from U.N.I.C.E.F E. Mediterranean area Progress Report for January 1952, re Storm Relief distribution to Jordan Border Village Poor. also supplies of cod liver oil.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

Cw 7/3

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
6/3.	29/4

Next Paper

37330

Extract from UNICEF E. Mediterranean Area Progress Report for Jan. 1952.

Erik (E)

E 1827/3 E ~~18214~~/1 E

Jordan Border Village Poor:

UNICEF skim milk distributions to the 30,000 Jordan Border Village Poor were organised by UNRWA and the Jordan government and finally began in the latter part of January, 1952. The plan of operations involves opening the presently existing UNRWA milk reconstitution centres to this population group and supplying stocks of milk to several voluntary agencies working in the area who will operate additional reconstitution centres so located as to reach beneficiaries living in sectors too far removed from the UNRWA distribution centers to permit their calling in for rations on a daily basis. In this manner the entire programme will be one of liquid milk distribution.

Of special interest to UNICEF is the possibility that the Jordan government will assume the operation of the UNRWA reconstitution and distribution centres, and that it has demonstrated its intention to assist the economic poor and refugees to the fullest extent possible within its economic limitations. It is reported that the Jordan Government has applied for the use of United Kingdom and Point Four loan funds for the purchase of wheat for free distribution to the economic poor of the Border Villages. At the same time, UNRWA agrees in principle to the loan of other foodstuffs to the Jordan Government for the benefit of this near-refugee population group provided the request to the United Kingdom and Point Four is granted. UNICEF simultaneously is offering surpluses of cod liver oil that require utilisation during the current winter month.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
- 6 MAR 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
1/3

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1827/4

1952

Mr Furlange,
Amman.
to Mr Evans.

18204/2.
25.2.52.
8.3.52.

Dispersal of Economic Refugees.

Discusses the obstacle of expense in the question of the dispersal of refugees.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

Copy to Sir H. Knight & to the Planning, BMEO.

CWatterlow
11/3

Letter to Sir H Knight enclosing copy of this letter

[illegible] 21/3

Reference

EE1821/2.

(Print)

(How disposed of) 24/3

Copy) BMEO Beirut
Dft) Sir H. Knight, Beirut
for Mr Evans.
21 Mar.

(Action completed)

[illegible] 24/3.

(Index)

[illegible] 17/6

Next Paper

37613

18204/2

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure

12.

British Legation,
Amman.

25th February 1952.

E E 1821/4

Dear Trefor,

I have read your letter EE 1821/2 of 6th February to Knight on milk supplies to economic refugees which raises once more the question of the dispersal of the refugees.

2. After examining the exchanges which have taken place on this subject between this Legation and the district office of UNRWA, I am doubtful whether more can be done here. This seems to be one of those unsatisfactory problems where everyone agrees on a solution but nothing is done. The last letter on the subject from Sir Alexander Galloway summarises the reasons. Dispersion would cost money initially for the movement and installation of the refugees, and would continue to cost more money from higher costs of administration. With the present sliding scale of reduced relief expenditure imposed upon UNRWA, these increased costs could not be borne. Furthermore the Jordan Government are pressing for an increased concentration of refugees in the Jordan valley, and are most unreceptive to requests for sites for refugees elsewhere.

3. The worst obstacle to my mind is the question of expense. Although it might be some help to represent the initial cost of dispersion as a reintegration expenditure, the higher administrative costs would remain. Since the district headquarters work within a policy framework set in Beirut and even further away, the main effort should be made there. I believe agreement in principle might be coaxed out of the Jordan Government: although the enforcement of the stern measures necessary to move refugees away from their proximity to Palestine might be difficult to obtain.

Yours ever,

G.W.Furlonge

(G.W.Furlonge)

T.E.Evans Esq.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
- 8 MAR 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
10/3

[redacted] 1827/4)

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTFILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

21st March, 1952.

Your letter of the 9th February regarding the economic refugees and, more generally, the dispersal of refugees in Jordan.

2. I enclose a copy of a letter, 18204/2 of the 25th February, from Her Majesty's Minister in Amman. You will see that Furlonge is doubtful whether any more can be done on the spot in Amman and that, in his view, the matter should be taken up in Beirut. You will also see that he considers that agreement in principle to dispersion might still be coaxed out of the Jordan Government.

3. It seems incredible that at a time when the Agency may lose substantial funds through not being able to commit them before the end of the financial year, finance should be one of the main obstacles to the operation. As I see it, the higher cost of administration resulting from dispersion, as well as the cost of movement and installation, would be a fair charge on the reintegration account.

4. Perhaps you would also look again at the letters already exchanged on the subject of building houses for small numbers of refugees in and near rural villages throughout Jordan and, in particular, Amman Chancery letter S182/1/113/51 of the 29th December. I was glad to see that housing figures fairly prominently in the tentative programme for Jordan recently proposed by the Agency and now, I believe, accepted in principle by the Jordan Government. Until detailed projects are known, however, we cannot be sure that due emphasis is given to building houses in rural areas, where, if scope were given to the initiative of individual refugees, they might find work and resettle themselves. Improved communications should help - I am thinking particularly of the roads programme to be financed from our recent loan, and especially improvement of the Kerak Road. There is surely no lack of cheap building sites (as opposed to agricultural land) in rural areas in Jordan; and even if the Agency had to buy such sites or provide the refugees with money to acquire them themselves, the financial commitment should be of manageable proportions.

5. I think all this is of sufficient importance to warrant your having a word with Blandford about it.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter, together with a copy of your letter under reply, to Furlonge.

(T. E. Evans)

Sir Henry Knight, K.C.S.I.,
C.S.I., C.I.E.,
British Legation,
Beirut.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

1952

PALESTINE

E E 1827/5

U.K. Delegation New York. Comm'd

ICEF/345.

25.2.52.

14.3.52.

Economic Refugees.

United Nations press release entitled "Economic Refugees in Jordan aided by Children's Fund."

Last Paper

(Minutes)

CW 15/3

Reference

-/3

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

17/3

(Index)

Next Paper

37613

UNITED NATIONS
Department of Public Information
Press and Publications Bureau
United Nations, N. Y.

E/1827/5

Press Release ICEF/345
25 February 1952

"ECONOMIC REFUGEES" IN JORDAN AIDED BY CHILDREN'S FUND

A group of 35,000 children and mothers in Jordan, known as "economic refugees," are now receiving short-term aid from the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

The term "economic refugees" connotes those who live in 60 border villages along the armistice line set up between Israel and Jordan at the cessation of hostilities in that area, in 1948. The area is around Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah.

Since these people have not left their homes and are not, technically, refugees, they have not been entitled to the aid which the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and other United Nations agencies have been providing during the past three and a half years.

On the other hand, they have no opportunities to earn their livelihood. In some instances, their land was on the other side of the new border, and in others, their jobs. On their side of the armistice line, their chance of earning a living was lessened by the economic dislocation, aggravated by the influx of refugees, also without means of support, and competing for any available work.

Failure of the wheat crop last year has made the situation desperate. The Government of Jordan asked UNICEF for help, which was granted by a mail poll made last week of the Fund's 26-nation Executive Board.

The Fund is sending 175 tons of dried skim milk powder for daily milk rations to 35,000 children and mothers through the end of May, at an estimated cost of $60,000. The situation will be reviewed when the Board meets in April.

UNICEF, which was the first agency to aid the Palestine refugees, in fall 1948, has continued to help large numbers ever since. Most of that time its aid has been reaching from 400,000 to 500,000 children and mothers, with supplementary foods, clothing and blankets and medicines. Altogether, more than $12,000,000 has been allocated for this purpose.

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RECEIVED IN C.B.
14 MAR 1952
SENT TO DEPT.

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

EE 1827/6

Economic Refugees.

Mr Crawford
BMEO Cairo
~~Mr Evans.~~

182/53/1
7.3.52.
14.3.52.

Discusses the destitute, near famine appearance of the economic refugees, & ways of providing relief for them.

Copied ~~Amman~~, & Sir H. Knight.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

See 19. & 121.

EW 26/1.

Reference
EE1827/1
EE1821/4/49/51.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

Next Paper

37613

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE,
10 SHARIA TOLUMBAT,
CAIRO.

(182/53/1)
CONFIDENTIAL

7th March, 1952.

E

E 1827/6

Dear Trefor.

Economic Refugees

Two things have lately made the Development Division more aware of the problem of the economic refugees - Walmsley's report and a recent visit to Western Jordan by Eyre, the Agricultural Adviser. The latter, at one time Acting Director of Agriculture to the Palestine Government, knows this region intimately and is in full agreement with Walmsley's views. I was so impressed by the report and by what Eyre told me that I held a meeting of the Development Division to discuss the question.

2. We feel that in the past too little attention has been given to the "economic" as opposed to the "official" refugees.

3. Walmsley and Eyre (in paragraph 7 of his notes on his visit to Jordan) bring out the stark truth that, of the "economic" refugees alone, there are just too many bodies for too few acres which are inherently infertile and with water too scanty for irrigation. Juggle with the problem as you will there is no way of getting round this. On top of it there is also the incubus of the "official" refugees, the lifting of which must be a prelude to any attempt at even a partial solution of the problem of the "economic" refugees. Even when the former have gone, the problem of the latter will be bad enough but with them it is impossible even to think of any long term solution. Another complication is that the Amman Government do not seem to take much interest in the west-bank people in general. Yet another complication is the effect of last year's bad harvest.

4. From Walmsley's description of the food situation among the economic refugees it seems obvious that some sort of relief in grain must be given at once. Chancery in Amman have made (in their letter 22207/2 of January 14th) certain suggestions and the Americans (see your EE18214/49 of December 28th, 1951) have hinted at a supply of free grain. Both these measures to be of any use must be carried out at once. Grain which is not now on its way from overseas may come too late.

22201/2
E 1827/1

5. The only other possible relief is work. There may be roads enough and the repair of the existing ones is probably already catered for. The only alternative seems to be land conservation, terracing and afforestation work. Eyre points out that, from a feeling of insecurity, it is unlikely that private individuals, even if they had the money, will undertake any of this. There is also the question of land title, which Eyre thinks might be got over and on which it will be necessary to consult Walpole. Still in spite of these difficulties, I can see no other type of relief work. The question is who is to provide the money. In this connection I think that there is a case for a joint discussion between the Jordan Government, Her Majesty's Government, the United States and UNRWA. As Eyre points out, this kind of work will be of lasting value though it may be hard to persuade hungry people to give up patches of grain for plantations of new fruit trees and vines. But, without relief work I do not see how these people can be kept alive.

6. All this is difficult enough. The long term solution, given the same area of land, is even worse but it seems obvious that no attempt should be made to settle "official" refugees in the area concerned. This is a hard thing to say when we are not certain how the money is to be raised for settling the "economic" refugees unless the Agency comes to

/their

T.E. Evans Esq., O.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office.

RECEIVED IN S.B.
14 MAR 1952
DEPT.
17/3

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE,
10 SHARIA TOLUMBAT,
CAIRO.

their aid. This seems doubtful as it has long since terminated relief works among the "official" refugees in favour of reintegration. Here we get back to the question of the increase in economic wealth as a means of refugee absorption, which caused such a stir at the last General Assembly of the United Nations.

7. This is a heart breaking problem to describe or prescribe for but the present necessities seem to be:

a) Immediate relief in grain either from the United States or from the release of £50,000 of Her Majesty's Government's loan.

b) A system of relief works mostly in terracing and some perhaps in forestry.

c) No settlement of official refugees in the areas concerned.

d) An attempt to persuade both the Jordan Government and the Agency (here I may be doing it an injustice) of the extreme gravity of the situation.

8. This will at least give a breathing space for the economic refugees whose destitute, near-famine appearance has impressed both Eyre and Bozman. Even this does not get us very far because, unless the Arab Governments, and especially Syria, take large numbers of "official" refugees, or Israel returns some of the frontier lands, there seems to be no hope whatever of a long term solution.

9. If any plans are drawn up for relief work such as I have suggested Eyre and Mooney can be of great help, either to the Jordan Government or the Agency.

10. I am sending a copy of this letter to Chancery Amman and to Sir Henry Knight.

Yours

(W.F. Crawford)

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

1952

PALESTINE

EE 1827/7

Sir H. Knight
UNRWA
to Mr Evans.

AC. 75.
15-3-52.
18. 3. 52.

Condition of economic refugees.

Dr Peterson, head of Medical Division of W.H.O. is disturbed about the nutritional condition of the economic refugees, esp. in the Jordan border villages.
(Copied) BMEO Cairo & Amman.

Last Paper

References

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(Print)

(How disposed of)

Sir H. Knight, Beirut
from Sir Waterlow
31 March.

(Minutes)

M.E.S. 20.3.52.

As regards the economic refugees in Jordan, the steps which the Americans and we are giving should soon begin to have their effect.

We have had no information for some time about what is being done for the economic refugees in Gaza. As far as I can ascertain from the papers, they are no longer receiving assistance from UNICEF or from AMER, and are therefore, presumably, being fed entirely by the Egyptian authorities. We might ask Sir H. Knight about this?

CWaterlow
25/3
CW 31/3

(Action completed)	(Index)
2/4	384

Next Paper

EE1827/7.

Minutes.

Nutritional deficiency of the economic refugees.

See UNRWA Monthly Report for March (EE 1821/18) pp 9-10. & FAO-WHO experts' report on EE1827/16.

Ed. Ito be part of the economic refugee file?

EW 7/5

E.D.M.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

(AC 75)

RESTRICTED

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

15th March, 1952.

E 1827/7

Dear Evans,

In conversation with Dr. Petersen, head of the Medical Division of UNRWA, Myers gathered that the W.H.O. nutritional team, which has just paid a visit to UNRWA territory, was satisfied with the nutritional condition of the refugees under UNRWA, but disturbed by that of the economic refugees.

2. It seems that while the E.R.s of Gaza are in a worse state than the refugees, the really serious cases were found among those in Jordan, particularly the border villages where were found cases of mal-nutrition and of half starvation.

3. I hope that a fuller report will be available at the end of the month, but you might in the meantime like to get this unofficial information.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to B.M.E.O., Cairo, and to Amman.

Yours sincerely,

(H. F. KNIGHT)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
18 MAR 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
3

OUTFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(EE 1827/7)

31st March, 1952.

In your letter AC 75 of March 15th to Trefor Evans about the economic refugees in Jordan you stated that the condition of the economic refugees in the Gaza area was not quite as bad as that of those in Jordan.

2. We have had no information for some time about what is being done for the economic refugees in Gaza. As far as I can make out from the files, they are no longer receiving assistance from either UNICEF or from AMER and are therefore presumably being fed entirely by the Egyptian authorities? We should be glad to know what the present position really is.

(C. M. Waterlow)

Sir Henry Knight, K.C.S.I.,
C.S.I., C.I.E.,
British Legation,
Beirut.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1827/8

Mr Furlonge,
Amman.
to Mr J. Bowker.

(18205/5)
10 · 3 · 52
18 · 3 · 52.

Jordan frontier villages.

Discusses the future of the economic refugees in the frontier villages, following a weekend tour of the area.

He has received a letter from the Prime Minister's office urging him to mediate with the United Nations on the subject.

Last Paper

(Copies) W. Va. BMEO, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem.

(Minutes)

Reference

Mr Furlonge thinks that the general despair of the inhabitants of the West Bank, which is particularly acute in the case of the "economic" refugees, is partly caused by a widespread belief that the Jews will eventually occupy the whole area.

2. He suggests that this could to a small extend be remedied if the Legation staff in general, and the Vice Consul in Nablus in particular, urged at every opportunity, that agression on the West Bank would be met by resolute action by ourselves in accordance with the Tripartite Declaration.

3. To let these statements carry more weight he would like United States action also to be foreshadowed, and asks us to authorise discussion on these lines, possibly after consultation with the State Department.

4. While I entirely agree that talk on the lines envisaged by Mr Furlonge is not only desirable but essential, I should, with respect, not have thought that any special authorisation was called for, and that this should already be a normal "talking point" on the part of the Legation Staff. The Tripartite Declaration itself would appear to give all the authority really necessary.

5. I also have some doubts of the wisdom of approaching the State Department in the sense indicated, lest we encourage them to think that we do not really fully expect them to abide by their undertaking should

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Mr Furlonge, Amman
from Mr J. Bowker.
22 March,
(Copy) Mr Burrows, W. Va
25/3.
(Copy) Sir T. Rapp, BMEO Egypt
Sir E. Evans, Tel Aviv
Mr. Money-Kyrle, Jerusalem
27 March

(Action completed)	(Index)
26/3	28/4

Next Paper

firm measures be required against Israel.

6. I suggest that Mr Furlonge's point would be met if we wrote back asking him to go ahead and saying that he could tell his American and French colleagues what he is doing, and if he wishes, hint that the former, at least, might like to do likewise.

Draft.

Christopher Prince Cordon
20.3.52.

I too am surprised that Mr Furlonge should have asked for authority to take what seems an obvious course.

I have somewhat stiffened the draft.

James C Wardrop
20/3.

MES 21/3 a/a.

A D M Ross
21/3

I agree
he could ~~send~~
copy the correspt.
to Mr Burrows.

R.J.B.
21/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

18205/5

CONFIDENTIAL

E 1827/8

British Legation,
Amman.

10th March 1952.

Eastern Dept.
(To enter).

R.9/3
17/3

My dear Jim,

It has been obvious since my arrival that the most immediately pressing economic problem in Jordan is the situation in Arab Palestine, and particularly in the frontier villages which are separated from their lands by the Armistice line. Our Vice Consul in Nablus maintains that, as I have already told you, many of these villagers are in a state of near-starvation, simply through lack of any means of earning their subsistence.

2. On March 6th I received a long letter from the Prime Minister's Office urging that we should "mediate with the United Nations Organisation" so that these people could be relieved. This did not appear to me to be a constructive approach to the problem, since I understand that the UNRWA have no power to regard these persons as refugees and cannot therefore do more than they are doing, namely to distribute half-rations to a limited number by reducing the total quantity distributed to the refugees in Jordan. I therefore told the Prime Minister today that, while naturally sympathetic, I did not feel that I could take up the question on the basis of the letter I had received: if the Jordan Government were to make a comprehensive plan for the relief of these people and let me know what they proposed and what help they required (over and above the £50,000 for free distribution of wheat which we have already paid them out of our £1½ million loan) I would certainly see if anything could be done. I understood from my United States colleague who received an identical letter that his reaction was similar.

3. In order to see for myself the conditions in the area, I spent a week-end touring it with our Vice Consul at Nablus. I could not, of course, check how near the subsistence level the frontier population is. There were, however, all the signs of a "depressed area": everywhere the people sitting about in apathetic misery, mourning over their former lands being intensively cultivated by the Israelis under their eyes, and with no heart to buckle to and make the best of the little they have left. The free distribution of wheat, if effectively carried out in adequate quantities, will no doubt keep them alive until the next harvest, after which things might be better; but this will prove no solution for the deep-rooted malaise of the area. Significantly, Communism seems to be spreading faster there than anywhere else in Jordan, despite the energetic efforts of the Jordan Security Services to stamp on it.

4. From what I have seen and heard, it seems to me that the root of the evil on the West Bank is a complete lack of confidence in the future of the area. The belief is widespread

..../that

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
18 MAR 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
17/3

that, sooner or later, Israel will take it, because Jewish influence in the United States, and our own subservience to the latter, will prevent any effective action to stop them. The other main West Bank grievance, namely that the Government in Amman take no interest in the area which accordingly receives far less than its due when economic development is being planned, may be in part attributable to the same belief being held in Amman.

5. It is depressing, and sometimes irritating, that so little faith should be reposed in the Anglo-Jordan Treaty and the Tripartite Statement of May 1950; but there it is. I have therefore been wondering whether there is anything we could do to restore confidence sufficiently to induce the people on the West Bank to get to work and the Jordan Government to support them. Any action, if it were to be effective, should primarily be taken by ourselves, as it seems clear that we (and only we) are still capable of influencing the population which, despite their criticism of our Palestine policy, still think wistfully of the Mandate as an era of prosperity and good government; though it would no doubt help if we could say that the United States Government (the French do not count there) associated themselves with any assurances we might give. What I should like would be for us here, and particularly our Vice Consul at Nablus who seems to enjoy a considerable influence on the West Bank, to take every suitable opportunity in conversation with local officials and notables to assert as positively as possible that we cannot conceive of any circumstance in which an agression from outside on the West Bank would not be met by resolute action by Her Majesty's Government in pursuance of their undertaking under the Treaty and the Tripartite Statement.

6. You may care to consider, possibly in conjunction with the State Department, whether some action on these lines can be authorised. It might well be insufficient to remedy West Bank stagnation but my impression is that it would help, and unless something is done Jordan pressure on us to help over this problem (quite apart from what we are doing already) seems likely to increase.

7. I am copying this letter to Franks at Washington, Rapp at B.M.E.O. and Evans at Tel Aviv, + Roney - Percy at Jerusalem.

Yours ever,

G.W. Furlonge

(G.W.Furlonge)

Beg today 22/11.30
22/12

Registry
No. EE 1827/8

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

G.W.
Mr. Furlonge CMG OBE
Amman

for Sir J.
Mr. Bowker.

James C Wardrop
20/3.

Copies to corresp
Mr. Burrows.
w'ton

RAMR
21/3

OUTFILE +1c

Thank you for letter of 10th March about conditions on the West Bank. It makes interesting, but depressing, reading.

2. I agree with the line you took in replying to the Jordan Prime Minister's request for our intervention on behalf of the "economic refugees".

3. I also agree with you as regards the need to improve these people's morale; and it goes without saying that you, your staff and the Vice Consul at Nablus should lose no opportunity of emphasizing that we are

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
22 MAR 1952
DEPT. TO TYPE
(12733) 7/51 D.L.

are as firmly wedded
to the tripartite Statement
as when we signed it.
We are ~~so~~ sure that
the Americans are of
like mind ~~with~~ and we
see no need to consult
the State Department.
But you may wish to
tell your American colleague
what you propose to say; that you
assume that he will
wish ~~his country to~~ it
to be known that his
country is in full accord
with us, and suggest to
him that he could very
well take the same line.

I am sending copies of
this letter, together
with a copy of
yours, to Bernard
Burrows.

R.G.S
21/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTFILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

22nd March, 1952.

(EE 1827/8)

CONFIDENTIAL

Thank you for letter of 10th March about conditions on the West Bank. It makes interesting, but depressing, reading.

2. I agree with the line you took in replying to the Jordan Prime Minister's request for our intervention on behalf of the "economic refugees".

3. I also agree with you as regards the need to improve these people's morale; and it goes without saying that you, your staff and the Vice Consul at Nablus should lose no opportunity of emphasizing that we are as firmly wedded to the Tripartite Statement as when we signed it. We are sure that the Americans are of like mind and we see no need to consult the State Department. But you may wish to tell your United States colleague what you propose to say; that you assume that he will wish it to be known that his country is in full accord with us, and suggest to him that he could very well take the same line.

4. I am sending copies of this letter, together with a copy of yours to Bernard Burrows.

(J. Bowker)

G.W. Furlonge, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Amman.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1827/9

Mr Furlonge,
AMMAN.
~~to~~ Mr Evans.

(1820 5/7)

17. 3. 52.
24. 3. 52.

Economic refugees - Jordan.

Stresses the gravity of the position.
Suggests that cash + Money be loaned
~~to~~ the Jordan Govt to help draw up a
plan for their relief.
Add. to Mr Crawford, BMEO

Last Paper

(Minutes)

Now see Mr Eyre's report at 121.
On 26/6.

Reference

-/8
6

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
6/8	6/7/10

Next Paper

37613

18205/7

CONFIDENTIAL

British Legation,
Amman.

17th March 1952.

I have read with interest your letter No. 182/53/1 of March 7th to Trefor Evans about the so-called "economic refugees" on the West Bank of Jordan. I am very glad that attention is being focused on this problem, which seems to me one of the most urgent ones confronting us here. I enclose for your information a copy of my letter No.18205/5 of March 10th to Bowker, which was written before I had read Walmsley's report and was concerned mainly with the political aspects. I do not, however, think that there is much difference between us as regards both the gravity of the position and the general line on which it ought to be tackled; there is no one remedy and any possible lines of approach must be followed.

2. You will see from paragraph 2 of my letter to Bowker that both I and my United States colleague have urged the Jordan Prime Minister to make a plan. In this connection, it would seem useful if we were to offer him the services of Eyre and Mooney in drawing it up. If you agree, and if they could be made available at fairly short notice, I will offer this to him.

3. Incidentally, I wish we could devise a means of coordinating our views and those of the Development Division when dealing with problems of this nature. Your experts' views are obviously of the greatest value, but it must frequently happen, as in the present case, that we here have views on other aspects of the problems, or local information not available in Cairo, and my experience in the Foreign Office suggests that it would be preferable if one report expressing an agreed view could go in, rather than two reports sent at different times and perhaps expressing slightly different views. However, perhaps we can discuss this if, as I hope, you come here shortly in connection with the establishment of the Committee on Development under our Loan.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Evans and Monypenny, to the latter of whom I am also venturing to send a copy of your letter under reply.

(G.W.Furlonge)

W.F.Crawford Esq.,
British Middle East Office,
Cairo

COPY

18205/5
CONFIDENTIAL

British Legation,
Amman.

10th March 1952.

It has been obvious since my arrival that the most immediately pressing economic problem in Jordan is the situation in Arab Palestine, and particularly in the frontier villages which are separated from their lands by the Armistice line. Our Vice Consul in Nablus maintains that, as I have already told you, many of these villagers are in a state of near-starvation, simply through lack of any means of earning the subsistence.

2. On March 6th I received a long letter from the Prime Minister's Office urging that we should "mediate with the United Nations Organisation" so that these people could be relieved. This did not appear to me to be a constructive approach to the problem, since I understand that the UNRWA have no power to regard these persons as refugees and cannot therefore do more than they are doing, namely to distribute half-rations to a limited number by reducing the total quantity distributed to the refugees in Jordan. I therefore told the Prime Minister today that, while naturally sympathetic, I did not feel that I could take up the question on the basis of the letter I had received: if the Jordan Government were to make a comprehensive plan for the relief of these people and let me know what they proposed and what help they required (over and above the £50,000 for free distribution of wheat which we have already paid them out of our £1½ million loan) I would certainly see if anything could be done. I understood from my United States colleague who received an identical letter that his reaction was similar.

3. In order to see for myself the conditions in the area, I spent a week-end touring it with our Vice Consul at Nablus. I could not, of course, check how near the subsistence level the frontier population is. There were, however, all the signs of a "depressed area": everywhere the people sitting about in apathetic misery, mourning over their former lands being intensively cultivated by the Israelis under their eyes, and with no heart to buckle to and make the best of the little they have left. The free distribution of wheat, if effectively carried out in adequate quantities, will no doubt keep them alive until the next harvest, after which things might be better; but this will prove no solution for the deep-rooted malaise of the area. Significantly, Communism seems to be spreading faster there than anywhere else in Jordan, despite the energetic efforts of the Jordan Security Services to stamp on it.

4. From what I have seen and heard, it seems to me that the root of the evil on the West Bank is a complete lack of confidence in the future of the area. The belief is widespread

.../that

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

that, sooner or later, Israel will take it, because Jewish influence in the United States, and our own subservience to the latter, will prevent any effective action to stop them. The other main West Bank grievance, namely that the Government in Amman take no interest in the area which accordingly receives far less than its due when economic development is being planned, may be in part attributable to the same belief being held in Amman.

5. It is depressing, and sometimes irritating, that so little faith should be reposed in the Anglo-Jordan Treaty and the Tripartite Statement of May 1950; but there it is. I have therefore been wondering whether there is anything we could do to restore confidence sufficiently to induce the people on the West Bank to get to work and the Jordan Government to support them. Any action, if it were to be effective, should primarily be taken by ourselves, as it seems clear that we (and only we) are still capable of influencing the population which, despite their criticism of our Palestine policy, still think wistfully of the Mandate as an era of prosperity and good government; though it would no doubt help if we could say that the United States Government (the French do not count there) associated themselves with any assurances we might give. What I should like would be for us here, and particularly our Vice Consul at Nablus who seems to enjoy a considerable influence on the West Bank, to take every suitable opportunity in conversation with local officials and notables to assert as positively as possible that we cannot conceive of any circumstance in which an agression from outside on the West Bank would not be met by resolute action by Her Majesty's Government in pursuance of their undertaking under the Treaty and the Tripartite Statement.

6. You may care to consider, possibly in conjunction with the State Department, whether some action on these lines can be authorised. It might well be insufficient to remedy West Bank stagnation but my impression is that it would help, and unless something is done Jordan pressure on us to help over this problem (quite apart from what we are doing already) seems likely to increase.

7. I am copying this letter to Franks at Washington, Rapp at B.M.E.O. and Evans at Tel Aviv and Monypenny at Jerusalem.

(G.W.Furlonge)

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1827/10

FROM

Sir T. Rapp.

B.M.E.O.

No. 7 (S)

Dated 21. 3. 52.

Received in Registry— 27. 3. 52.

Relief for economic refugees.

Dr Mooney cannot be made available for some time, but Eyre will arrive in Amman within the next few days.

Add. to Amman No 19 of 21/3

REFERENCES

-/9

MINUTES

C Watkins
27/3

CW 20/6.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 21/6

(Index) 18/7

39984

1/ Cairo A 39

27 MAR 1952 027013 F.O.

E

~~CYPHER/OTP TELEGRAM~~
~~OUT.~~

NO COPIES PLEASE

Cypher/OTP Cont
and by conf bag

From: B.M.E.O. Despd. 1130 hrs 22/3

To : ~~Amman~~ Foreign Office

CB

No. : ~~19~~ 7 saving Dated. 21st March, 1952.

R 27 3 52

RESTRICTED.

Addressed to Amman telegram No. 19 dated 21st March repeated for information Saving to Foreign Office No. 7 and Jerusalem No. 4

Your letter 18205/7. / 17th March_/.

E E 1827/10

Economic Refugees.

E E 1827/9

From Crawford.

Mooney cannot be made available immediately but Eyre is arriving in Amman within the next few days and I suggest that you make as much use of him as possible. Mooney's views on afforestation are on record and it is rather for Yakoub Salti to apply them in suitable areas and for Mooney to make specific new recommendations for economic refugees.

2. I will write later and look forward to discussing with you in Amman.

Distribution.
File
Mr. Crawford.
Miss Sullivan.
Sir Thomas Rapp.

27 MAR 1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1827/11

1952

FROM

Sir F. Evans, Tel Aviv.

Mr Bawker.

No. (10212/16/52)

Dated 24. 3. 52.

Received in Registry— 27. 3. 52.

Economic refugees.

Considers H.M.G.'s obligation to defend the Jordanian kingdom against any aggression, particularly from Israel.

(Copied) W. Van, BMEO Fayid, Amman & Jerusalem.

References

EE1827/8

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft) Sir F. Evans, Tel Aviv

for Sir J. Bawker. 4 April

(Copy) Sir O. Franks, W. Van

Sir T. Rapp, Fayid

Mr Furlonge, Amman.

Mr Mongpenny, J'lem.

4 April.

(Action completed) 7/4

(Index) 28/4

MINUTES

I doubt if we can afford to speculate on the action we should take if the Jordan monarchy and government ceased to exist as ~~separate~~ independent entities. "Aggression" seems to me to postulate the existence not only of an aggressor state, but also of a state susceptible of being "aggressed against", and in the absence of the latter it is at least arguable that guarantees against aggression would cease to have any meaning or validity.

Meanwhile I think we have every justification for telling the Jordanians that we can think of no aggression that we should not resist in pursuance of our obligations under the Treaty and the Tripartite Statement. If those instruments were invalidated by circumstances that

40429

that would be another matter.

I attach a draft reply

James C Wardrop
2/4.

I agree, but should be grateful if the Legal Advisers would look at the draft.

A. M. Ross
2/4

Mr V. Evans.
[illegible]
3/4

R. J. B
3/4

A Sir F. Evans Tel Aviv to Sir J. Bowker 2.5.52.

Sir F. Evans appears to mean that "cannot conceive" would mean "cannot conceive of of the circumstances arising which he envisages." As I read preceding minutes, we have met him by a mental reservation in the definition of aggression, namely that aggression, properly so defined, could not take place in the circumstances he envisages.

/Since

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

Since the strength of the phrase "cannot conceive" is essential to Mr. Furlonge's formula, we ought perhaps to put him right.

Dft.

Jm. Hunter
21.V

I think that there are in fact two points which worry Sir Francis Evans in the formula at the end of paragraph 5 of Mr Furlonge's letter of 10th March

(i) the words "cannot conceive of" which he feels are too sweeping, and

(ii) the reference to "the West Bank", since the guarantee under the treaty & the tripartite statement are not given in respect of the West Bank as such but in respect of the State of Jordan, and whereas the State of Jordan might cease to exist the West Bank will always be with us.

Mr Furlonge on the other hand is searching for a formula with a kick in it

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

and he feels that simply to repeat that we are as determined as ever to carry out our obligations under the Treaty and the Tripartite Statement is rather lifeless.

Could we ~~not~~ perhaps satisfy both by adding to the formula in our letter of 4th April (about which everyone is agreed in principle) some such words as "and would take resolute action in the event of ~~against~~ any aggression on Jordan ~~[illegible]~~?"

W. M. Evans
29/5.

I have made a small amendment which might meet Mr Evans's point.

Jas. Hunter
29.v

Mr Evans again

James C Wardrop
30/5

The suggestion which I made in the last paragraph of my minute was rather more radical and I am afraid that Sir T. Evans will not be very happy if the words "cannot conceive of" are allowed to stand. He may

/well

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

well object that a formula which requires such a comprehensive explanation as that in Mr. Hunter's draft is not very suitable for public consumption in Jordan. However I am content to leave the matter to the Department.

W.J. Brown
30/5

Mr Hunter's draft represents the position as I see it, and I don't think there would even be any question of giving the explanation of the formula - as distinct from the formula itself - any currency in Jordan or elsewhere.

Nevertheless, Sir F. Evans seems so thoroughly to have misunderstood the situation that I doubt whether any further correspondence on this admittedly complicated question will clear matters up. I should on the whole favour suspending the draft altogether

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

(44085) WT.31461/245 220,000 11/51 A.&E.W.LTD. Gp.685

altogether, the more so since Mr Furlonge has raised no further objections. If either of them so desires we can always have a talk about this at the forthcoming Conference.

James L Wardrop
5/6.

I have no objection.

A. W. McRose
7/6

I agree that this is becoming too much involved & that we had better clear up any remaining misunderstandings ~~and~~ or misconceptions in conversation with Mr Furlonge & Sir F. Evans during the Conference.

R. J. B.
10/6

Draft suspended 10/6

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Eastern Dept. (to enter) (think our reply to Mr. Furlonge was appropriate)

R.J.B. 26/3

EE 1827/11 E.

BRITISH LEGATION,
TEL AVIV.

(10212/16/52)
SECRET

24th March, 1952

EE1827/8

Dear Bowker,

Would you please refer to Furlonge's letter to you of the 10th March about the situation in Arab Palestine. It is obviously right that British officials in Jordan should reassert in conversations with officials and notables our determination to defend Jordanian territory from any aggression, as we are pledged to do; but I am somewhat doubtful about Furlonge's suggested form of words and in particular about the reinforcing statement that Her Majesty's Government "cannot conceive of any circumstances in which aggression from outside" would not be met by resolute action by us. Seen from here this seems to be a little strong. I presume we should certainly have to help to defend Jordan against any straightforward Israel aggression; but I am wondering what policy Her Majesty's Government would adopt in the event, for example, of Jordan collapsing into anarchy or of the Jordan monarchy and government being overthrown by revolution or by intervention from other Arab States. What, for example, would be our position if Haj Amin should profit from such a situation to take over in Arab Palestine? I quite realise that any such eventualities are at present unlikely, but I submit that they are conceivable and if one of these events were to precede an Israel invasion of Arab Palestine I am not clear as to where we should stand. I presume that much would depend on the circumstances. I imagine that the most likely eventuality of those I have mentioned is an invasion by the Iraqis in the event of Jordanian collapse, and it is within the bounds of possibility that this might be regarded by Israel (which of course has no armistice agreement with Iraq) as justifying absorption of Arab Palestine with, no doubt, a repetition of the stimulated flight of the Arabs in 1948. In other words, I wonder what our position would be and how far the Treaty would hold good if the Jordanian monarchy and government ceased for any reason to exist as independent entities.

2. In the light of these considerations I wonder whether it might not be better if Furlonge and the Vice-Consul were to remind notables and officials straightforwardly of Her Majesty's Government's obligation to defend the Jordanian kingdom against any aggression.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to Franks, Rapp, Furlonge and Monypenny.

Yours ever,
R.T. Landale
for H.M. Minister

Sir James Bowker
K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
27 MAR 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
27/3.

Registry
No. GE 1827/11

~~Top Secret.~~
Secret.
~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

Sir Francis Evans KCMG

Tel Aviv
from Sir J Bowker

Copies to
Sir O Franks
~~Sir T R~~
Washington
Sir T Rapp
Fayid
Mr Furlonge
Amman
Mr Monypenny
Jerusalem.

James C Wardrop
2/4

W. V. Evans 3/4
first

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
- 4 APR 1952
SENT TO TYPE 4/4
DESPATCHED

(12733) 7/51 D.L.

OUTFILE

SECRET.

In your letter of 24th March you expressed some doubt about Furlonge's proposed formula for use in building up morale on the West Bank.

2. Both our Treaty and the Tripartite Statement commit us to defend the State of Jordan against aggression. But if, in the circumstances you envisage, that State ~~were~~ ceased to exist as an independent entity the position would be radically

radically changed; and we
~~cannot very well~~
~~I should not care to~~
speculate on the extent
to which those instruments
might in that event still
be binding on us.

3. I doubt, however, whether
this is so very relevant
to Fulange's proposal. In
effect all he wants to
say is that we are
as determined as ever
to carry out our obligations
under the treaty and
the Tripartite Statement.
On that we can have no
two opinions and the more
widely it is known the
better. What would happen
if circumstances were such
as to invalidate those
instruments is another
question.

I am copying this letter to
the other recipients of yours.

R.A.B.

3/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTFILE

(EE 1827/11)

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

4th April, 1952.

In your letter of 24th March you expressed some doubt about Furlonge's proposed formula for use in building up morale on the West Bank.

Both our Treaty and the Tripartite Statement commit us to defend the State of Jordan against aggression. But if, in the circumstances you envisage, that State ceased to exist as an independent entity the position would be radically changed; and we cannot very well speculate on the extent to which those instruments might in that event still be binding on us.

I doubt, however, whether this is so very relevant to Furlonge's proposal. In effect all he wants to say is that we are as determined as ever to carry out our obligations under the Treaty and the Tripartite Statement. On that we can have no two opinions and the more widely it is known the better. What would happen if circumstances were such as to invalidate those instruments is another question.

I am copying this letter to the other recipients of yours.

(J. Bowker)

Sir Francis Evans, K.C.M.G.,
Tel Aviv.

Eastern Dept.
R.G.B.
14/5

EE 1827/11 A

British Legation,
Tel-Aviv

2nd May, 1952

(10212/23/52)
SECRET

Dear Sir,

I am in entire agreement with your letter EE 1827/11 of the 4th April about building up the morale on the west bank of the Jordan; and I gather that you agree with me that the use of the phrase "cannot conceive" is too strong.

I am distributing this letter as previously.

Yours ever,

Frank.

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
15 MAY 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
16/5.

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES.

[To be released at 1600 hours British Summer Time on Thursday, 25th May, 1950.]

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers' meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab States and Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statement:

1. The three Governments recognise that the Arab States and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defence and to permit them to play their part in the defence of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connexion the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on 4th August, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel.

2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances will be requested from any other states in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

Registry No. EE 1827/11

~~Top Secret.~~
Secret.
~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

JMH

Draft.

Letter to:

Sir Francis Evans
Tel Aviv.

From:

Sir James Bowker.

Copy to:

Sir O Franks,
Washington;

Sir T. Rapp,
Fayid;

G.W. Furlonge,
Esq.,
Amman;

Mr. Monypenny,
Jerusalem.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
-3 JUN 1952
SENT TO TYPE 3/6
DESPATCHED

J.M. Hunter
22.V

Please see minute
Mr. V. Evans 29/5
Ainst

22/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Wt. 11647/234 250m 7/51 V.P.Co. 51-8078

Suspend
~~44c~~

Thank you for your letter 10212/23/52 of the 2nd May about measures to build up morale on the west bank of the Jordan. While I am glad to hear that we are agreed in principle, I think we may have to go a little further into the wording. As I see it, the strength of the phrase "cannot conceive" is an essential part of Furlonge's formula; and I believe that it can be used in the formula without going too far.

2. The principle on which we are agreed is that in the circumstances which you envisage the guarantees against aggression would not necessarily apply. We reason that this contingency is covered by the use of the word "aggression". It postulates the existence not only of an aggressor State, but of a State susceptible of being the object of aggression; and in the circumstances envisaged it is arguable that the latter would have ceased to exist, and with it the meaning and validity of guarantees against aggression. This argument would be stronger if we referred to the State of Jordan rather than the West Bank.

3. Given this reservation in the meaning of the word "aggression", it is not necessary to admit that one can conceive of the circumstances you envisage arising, and it is permissible to say that one cannot conceive of any circumstances (that is, any other circumstances) in which we would not stand by our guarantees against aggression (as we have defined it above).

4. ~~I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.~~ We should therefore prefer to see Furlonge's formula maintained, substituting "~~West~~ Jordan" for "West Bank,

/ while

while making it plain that the former includes the latter.

5. I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

X X

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

1952

PALESTINE

E E 1827/12

FROM

Mr Furlonge.
Amman
to Sir J. Bowker.

No. (18205/12)

Dated

Received in Registry— 25. 3. 52.
7. 4. 52.

References

1/8

(Print)

(How disposed of)

~~Mr Furlonge~~
Amman for Sir J. Bowker
15 April

(Action completed)	(Index)
16/4	1/8

Economic refugees on the West Bank.

Emphasises the importance of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty to the economic refugees.

MINUTES

I am to blame for the unfortunate omission (in our letter of March 22nd at -/8) of any reference to the Treaty of Alliance, which, as Mr Furlonge points out, is the most important of the two instruments committing us to defend Jordan.

Meanwhile Mr Furlonge will have seen from our letter of April 4th to Sir F Evans that we are as determined as ever to carry out our obligations under the Treaty as well as the Tripartite Statement so long as those instruments remain valid. Nevertheless a mise au point is perhaps called for; and I accordingly submit a draft.

James C Wardrop
10/4.

R.G.B.
10/4

39984

18205/12
CONFIDENTIAL

British Legation,
Amman.

25th March 1952.

EE 1827/12

My dear Jim,

I am sorry to come back on you on your letter EE 1827/8 of March 22nd about the West Bank, but the formula provided in its third paragraph differs rather significantly from that suggested in paragraph 5 of my letter 18205/5 of March 10th, in that the former does not refer to the Anglo-Jordan Treaty. In Arab Palestine, as, I believe, throughout the Arab States, it is the Treaty which creates such confidence as there is, and the Tripartite Statement is only of value, if at all, as indicating that U.S. policy is broadly in line with ours. It is for this reason that I should like us to be able to speak rather on the lines of the last sentence of paragraph 5 of my letter of March 10th, but I wanted to make sure that there was no misunderstanding on this point.

Yours ever,

(G.W.Furlonge)

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

15/3
15/4

Registry
No. EE 1827/12

~~Top Secret.~~
Secret.
~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

G.W.
Mr Furlonge, CMG, OBE
Amman

from
Sir J. ~~A.~~ Bowker.

James C Wardrop
10/4.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
15 APR 1952
SENT TO TYPE 15/4
DESPATCHED

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(42023) WT.41304/225 150,000
2/51 A.&E.W.LTD. GP.685

OUTFILE

You were quite right to draw attention in your letter of 25th March to the omission from mine of the 22nd of any reference to our Treaty obligations to defend Jordan. I regret the error.

2. As you will by now have seen from my letter of 4th April to Evans we are as determined as ever to carry out our obligations under the Treaty as well as the Tripartite Statement so long as those instruments remain valid. We can

therefore

therefore agree, despite this doubt, that the formula suggested in your letter of 10th March will meet the case.

R.J.B.
6/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTFILE

(EE 1827/12) FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

SECRET 15th April, 1952.

You were quite right to draw attention in your letter of the 25th March to the omission from mine of the 22nd of any reference to our Treaty obligations to defend Jordan. I regret the error.

2. As you will by now have seen from my letter of the 4th April to Evans we are as determined as ever to carry out our obligations under the Treaty as well as the Tripartite Statement so long as those instruments remain valid. We can therefore agree, despite his doubts, that the formula suggested in your letter of the 10th March will meet the case.

(J. Bowker)

G.W. Furlonge, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Amman.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E. 1827/13.

FROM

Sir H. Knight
Beirut.
to Mr Evans.

No.

Dated

Received in Registry— 7.4.52.
16.4.52.

Dispersal of Economic Refugees.

Discusses the reluctance of the villages to accept refugees & the reluctance of the refugees to move.

Copied) Amman.

REFERENCES

-/4

MINUTES

Letter is Mr Furlonge issued.

[illegible] 26/4

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dfd) Mr Furlonge, Amman.
from Mr Evans.
26 apl
Copy) Sir H Knight Beirut
26/4

(Action completed)	(Index)
[illegible] 28/4	[illegible] 30/5

39213

Evans

(A.C. [illegible])

Confidential.

Beirut

7.4.52

EE 1827/13

My dear Evans

your EE 1827/4 of 21.3.52.

I disagree that the chief obstacle to the dispersion of the refugees from the enormous camps is the matter of expense. Galloway had been given a free hand by Blandford to do anything to get refugees into villages and has also had the help of a special man from the Welfare Divn at H.Q who is in Jordan for this object. Villages have been offered roads, water supply, etc if they will accept refugees and not object to houses being built for them. But all or practically all schemes have foundered on either the unwillingness of the villagers to accept refugees, or on the unwillingness of the refugees to move. (An exception seems to be round Kerak side where Pruen told me a certain number of refugees are sttling satisfactorily, but I have not got the further details he promised and the trip to Kerak, the south of the Dead Sea, and elsewhere was more than I had time to manage.)

There seems no doubt that the average refugee at present prefers to live in a tolerable house that he has built in a camp, where he has schools for his children, the services of a doctor, the presnce of his friends and relations, no work to do, his food provided free, and unlimited discussion at the coffee shops, and the to him certainty that the Ad Com Powers will go on providing these untill some development enables him to return to his home in Palestine.....or at least he shuts his eyes to any other possibility for the present. And as the Arab States seem to share this idea, it is difficult to blame the refugee. I only hope that UNRWA will get such cooperation from the Arab Govts this year that they will disabuse the refugees of this attitude of mind.

Whether the change of direction in UNRWA'S Jordan affairs will make a difference and let progress be made

it is of courde too early to conjecture.

Blandford tells me that the idea of giving money to refugees to build themselves houses wherever they might have found something to do, seems to have been lost sight of somewhere in the Jordan office.

~~This may all be~~ Blandford's view that the responsibility for part of the lack of progress ought to be placed on Galloway may of course be coloured by prejudice, but he cannot be blamed for the villagers' or the refugees' attitude.

Some day probably a shock will have to be administerd to both Govts and refugees, but the timing is important and I dont think the present is the right time.

yours sincerely,

H. F. Knight.

I am sending a copy of this to Fortune

RECEIVED IN C.B.
16 APR 1952
SENT TO DEPT.

(EE 1827/13)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

26th April, 1952.

OUTFILE

You will have seen from Knight's letter AC 75 of the 7th April that he attributes the lack of progress with refugee dispersal in Jordan not to the lack of funds, but to the absence of collaboration on the part of Jordanian villagers and of the refugees themselves. In the last analysis this seems to me to boil down to an unco-operative attitude on the part of the Jordan Government. I may be wrong, but I find it difficult to understand how the village Muchtars could disregard definite instructions from the Minister of the Interior in Amman to provide (against payment if necessary) building sites for limited numbers of refugee houses in their villages. Once the houses were built, refugee families could probably be induced to occupy them, though again the co-operation of the Jordan Government in the form of gentle pressure might be necessary.

2. It occurs to me that the Agency might unofficially enlist the support of Glubb Pasha, who, I believe, has strong views on this question of dispersal and resettlement in villages and has actually experimented on these lines with some success. It might be that the influence in their villages of Arab Legionaries, both active and retired, could be used with advantage to produce a better atmosphere in the communities that might take in small numbers of refugees.

3. I should be very interested to know whether you feel you could say a word in the right quarters to get things moving.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Knight.

(T. E. Evans)

G. W. Furlonge, Esq., CMG., OBE.,
British Legation,
Amman.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1827/14

U.K. Delegation
New York.
Comm'd.

E/ICEF/R.301.
24.3.52
17.4.52.

Economic refugees.

Recommendation for an apportionment to Jordan for continued emergency feeding assistance.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)
Original entered US 1842/15

CW 1914

References.

-/5

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
21/4	2814

Next Paper.

30471 F.O.P.

UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL

RESTRICTED

E/ICEF/R.301
24 March 1952

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

E/E1827/14

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND

Programme Committee

RECOMMENDATION OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR AN APPORTIONMENT TO JORDAN FOR CONTINUED EMERGENCY FEEDING ASSISTANCE

Summary

1. In this paper, the Administration recommends, subject to the availability of funds, an apportionment to Jordan of $110,000 from the allocation for "Emergencies" for the provision of skim milk for assistance to about 35,000 children and mothers in the frontier villages of Jordan.

2. If this recommendation is approved, it will represent the extension of a programme already in operation for which an apportionment of $60,000 was made by the UNICEF Board by mail poll ballot in February 1952.

The Problem

3. The situation described in the Executive Director's recommendation for the emergency allocation of $60,000 (E/ICEF/R.270) is substantially unchanged and it is too early to report any material effects so far made by the distribution of UNICEF supplies.

4. A recent field survey made by one of the international staff members of the UNICEF Eastern Mediterranean Area Office further confirmed the tragic conditions in which many of these border villagers are found. Several deaths from starvation within the past months have been reported.

5. The situation in the Nablus and Ramallah areas north of Jerusalem is worse than in the south, partially due to the inaccessibility of the villages and the

/greater difficulties

greater difficulties of organizing relief distribution. The villages in the south are nearer together and seem to have received some sporadic voluntary relief because of proximity to distribution centres.

. Pending arrival of UNICEF milk supplies from the February allocation, UNRWA has advanced milk powder from field stocks delivered by UNICEF for the Palestine Refugee Programme and also organized a distribution with the assistance of teams normally serving adjacent refugee camps. Demonstrations of mixing were given with the first distribution but on account of shortage of personnel, issues so far have been mostly in the form of dry rations. Field observation confirmed that the children were receiving the milk at home.

. Coordination of the services of voluntary societies in the area is being organized and several new mixing centres are being opened by these agencies for the distribution of the UNICEF milk, thus relieving UNRWA of part of the burden of distribution. Transportation to all centres continues to be undertaken by the agency.

. The Government has been unable to date to provide assistance beyond the issue of a small quantity of flour at reduced prices and the loan of buildings as distribution centres. Help in the provision of local personnel has been promised but conditions generally are too poor and primitive to expect organizational matching on the normal lines of other UNICEF assisted feeding programmes. The cooperation of UNRWA and of the voluntary agencies is proving indispensable for the implementation of the programme.

9. The supplies so far allocated by UNICEF will serve to provide the equivalent of a cup of milk per day to about 35,000 children and mothers through the next four months. The Government is organizing a distribution of twelve kilos per head of wheat to be supplied out of foreign loan aid but prospects of other relief for

/the entire group

the entire group are small. The Government is hopeful that there may be some betterment in the situation by the end of the year; there are hopes of a better harvest after the plentiful spring rains and some general economic improvement in the country should result from bi-lateral assistance and the implementation of the UNRWA reintegration plans for refugees. It would be over-optimistic, however, to expect any fundamental changes in the border villages before 1953. Continued UNICEF aid during this period is therefore of great importance.

Plan of Operations

Objectives

10. It is proposed to continue and to improve the present distribution arrangements with the assistance of UNRWA and voluntary agencies so as to distribute liquid milk from centres within reach of most of the villages. The help of village committees and school teachers will be employed as far as these exist and can co-operate. Where mixing centres cannot be organized dry rations will continue to be given. Skim milk will be issued on a ration basis of 40 grams per head per day, and where feasible cod liver oil (of which some quantities have been released by UNRWA from the Palestine Refugee Program) on a basis of 10 grams per head.

UNICEF Commitments

11. Stocks under the present allocation should be sufficient to last through 30 June 1952. It is estimated that for the six-month period 1 July - 31 December, 1952, further deliveries of skim milk totalling 200 tons, costing about $80,000 would be required from UNICEF. In addition to this milk powder, the Administration recommends the allocation of $30,000 for the provision of other food supplies which are expected to be received as contributions in kind, possibly fats, grains or sugar.

12. The Beirut office of UNICEF will continue to make periodical field

/inspections of

inspections of the distribution.

UNRWA and Voluntary Societies

13. The major task of transporting supplies and of organizing field teams for distribution has been assumed by UNRWA. An Agency Field Supervisor has recently been appointed to coordinate the assistance available from voluntary relief societies and to follow up implementation of distribution plans. It appears most unlikely that any additional help in terms of food will be afforded by the Agency beyond the half rations already being issued to about 9,000 Jerusalem poor. It is hoped that gifts through voluntary agencies may eventually provide additional assistance for the border groups.

Government Commitments

14. The Government is unable, for reasons of financial stringency to make any firm commitments for food assistance beyond the distribution of twelve kilograms per head of imported wheat now being arranged. If harvests are good some indigenous food supplies may become available.

Conclusion

15. The acute need of this group of Jordan children and mothers persists and there is little prospect of any material change within the next half year. The extent of relief forseeable from sources other than the present UNICEF distribution is almost negligible, unless an appreciable improvement in the general economy of the country takes place.

Status of Agreement

16. A basic standard agreement is being negotiated with the Government of Jordan and is expected to be signed in the near future.

Previous Apportionment

17. The only previous apportionment to Jordan was the emergency allocation of $60,000 for skim

$60,000 for skim milk made in February 1952. If approval is given to the recommendation herein, the total would be $170,000.

Recommendation

13. The Administration recommends, subject to the availability of funds, an apportionment of $110,000 to Jordan from the allocation for "Emergencies" to provide skim milk and other foodstuffs for the period 1 July - 31 December 1952 for 35,000 children and mothers.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1827/15

FROM

Sir H. Knight
Beirut.
to Miss Waterlow

No. AC 111

Dated

Received in Registry— 19.4.52
29.4.52

Gaza Economic Refugees.

Encloses a report from the Social Welfare Division of UNRWA on the present position of the Gaza residents.

References

-/7

MINUTES

A helpful report.
The most unsatisfactory aspect of the situation is the irregularity of the Egyptian Government's food distribution.

CWaterlow
3/5

African Dept
To see.

Thank you
RP 9/5.

9/5

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
SS 10/5.	30/5

39984

Beirut. 19/4/52

Gaza

E E 1827/15

E

(AC111)

Dear Miss Waterlow.

Your letter EE 1827/7 of 31.3.52 about Gaza Economic Refugees.

I enclose a report from the Social Welfare Division of UNRWA. I send it in original as there is not time to copy it.

yours sincerely

H T Taylor

RECEIVED IN C.R.
29 APR 1952
SENT TO REG.
30/x

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Ref. 11.102 April 18, 1952.

To : Chief, Social Welfare Division.

From : Special Assistant, Social Welfare Division.

Subject: Sir Henry Knight's query regarding feeding of Gaza residents.

With reference to Sir Henry Knight's letter, attached, as a result of conversations with the Gaza Welfare Officer my understanding of the present situation is as follows:

1. Milk

It was originally estimated that Gaza residents numbered approximately 90,000. Of this number the Egyptian Government, UNRWA, and UNICEF came to the conclusion that there were 60,000 who could be classified as economic refugees and represented the neediest portion of the indigenous inhabitants.

Since eligible UNICEF beneficiaries would be approximately half of this number, or 30,000, UNICEF agreed to supply milk for that number. Distribution of UNICEF milk to 30,000 eligible beneficiaries through UNRWA centers, therefore, was instituted and continued until AMER milk came on the scene.

Upon the occasion of AMER surplus milk being made available to the Egyptian Government, it was agreed that sufficient stocks of AMER milk would be supplied to UNRWA by the Egyptian Government to take care of the 30,000 beneficiaries among the economic refugees formerly provided with UNICEF milk.

Plans for distribution along these lines were set up and carried out. Of all the eligible economic refugees in UNICEF categories, however, only an average of 10,000 have been calling daily for their milk entitlement. Thus AMER milk supplies made available to UNRWA for distribution to the 30,000 economic refugees, have lasted longer than was anticipated. UNRWA is continuing to distribute milk to all eligible UNICEF categories among the economic refugees who have been registered, and supplies are sufficient at the present rate of consumption to continue such distribution until mid-summer, at which time UNICEF will begin supplying milk for this group until the withdrawal of UNICEF from the Agency programme. In addition, the Egyptian Government at irregular intervals has distributed irregular amounts of AMER powdered milk to all economic refugees in the Gaza District. This distribution might be said to average once every six weeks and has varied in amount from 1 kgm. to 5 kgms. of powdered milk per beneficiary. To date it has been impossible for the Gaza Welfare Officer to determine the exact amount of AMER milk supplies remaining in Government stores. His own estimate is that it is in the neighborhood of 150 tons.

2. Food

UNRWA does not distribute either half or full rations to any of the economic refugees. Originally UNICEF distributed some margarine and sugar, but today the only type of distribution of this sort which takes place is the use of sugar which is mixed with the milk and distributed as sweetened milk to refugees and non-refugees alike, three times a week.

According to the Gaza Welfare Officer, the Government distributes food in greatly varying types and amounts to the economic refugees at very irregular intervals. He also reports that several weeks ago the Government began studying UNRWA methods of ration distribution in the hope of regularising their own procedure. To what extent money and food supplies will be available to the Egyptian Government in order to provide for a regular and standardised distribution is not known.

It also should be noted that shipments of food supplies, earmarked for the Gaza economic refugees, have been received by UNRWA, Gaza, from such organisations as the Irish Red Cross, Australian Red Cross, New Zealand Red Cross and others. The exact quantities of these supplies are not known at this Headquarters because in many cases they have been shipped directly to the Chief District Officer, Gaza, by the donors.

3. Comparison of Gaza and Jordan Economic Refugees

No detailed comparisons of the relative state of health of the Gaza and Jordan economic refugees has been undertaken. It is the opinion, however, of the Health and Welfare Divisions, confirmed by the observations of Doctors Van Veen, FAO, and Burgess, WHO, that the Jordan economic refugees show more nutritional deficiency signs and have a lower general state of health than the Gaza economic refugees.

R.W. Downar
Special Assistant,
Social Welfare Division.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E 1827/16

1952

FROM

Mr H. Knight
Beirut
to Miss Waterlow

No. AC. 82.

Dated

Received in Registry— 25.4.52. 30.4.52

Palestine refugees.

Attaches a report on conditions of refugees – especially regarding "economic" refugees by Dr Burgess, of W.H.O.

References

MINUTES

See pp 10-11 – nutritional state of the economic refugees, & 19- preparation for resettlement.

I will send this report to the Medical Research Council for obs.

CWaterlow 7/5

7/5

CW 7/5

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft) Dr Landsborough Thomson & Miss Waterlow 7 May.

See with.

Of U.N. Press Release H/881 of 2 May.

CW 24/6.

(Action completed)	(Index)
8/5	5/6

39984

E E1827/76

(AC 82)

UNCLASSIFIED

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

25th April, 1952.

Dear Miss Waterlow,

You might be interested to see the attached W.H.O. report on condition of refugees - especially regarding the economic refugees.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. KNIGHT)

Miss C.M. Waterlow, M.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
30 APR 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
1
5

Middle East Secretariat,

OUTFILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

7th May, 1952.

EE1827/16

.....

The enclosed report by nutrition experts of the World Health Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations may perhaps be of interest to the Medical Research Council.

We should be glad to have any comments you may wish to make on it, and grateful if you would return it in due course.

(C. Waterlow.)

Dr Landsborough-Thomson, C.B., O.B.E.,
Medical Research Council,
38, Old Queen Street,
S.W. 1.

Delegate of U.K.
Advisory Commission.

REPORT

ON THE NUTRITION PROBLEMS

OF THE PALESTINE ARAB REFUGEES

by

Dr. R.C. Burgess

Chief, Nutrition Section, WHO

and

Dr. A.G. van Veen

Senior Supervisory Officer,
Nutrition Division, FAO

2 April 1952

FAO/52/4/1865

C O N T E N T S

INTRODUCTION

Part I - A. ASSESSMENT OF NUTRITIONAL STATUS

(1) Mortality and Morbidity Rates

(2) Body Weight and Growth Rate

(3) Clinical Examinations

B. REFUGEES LIVING UNDER DIFFERENT CONDITIONS

C. NON-REFUGEES

Part II - (1) BASIC RATION

(2) MILK SUPPLIES

(3) SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING

Part III - OTHER MATTERS

(1) Education

(2) Food Habits

(3) General Food Production

(4) Preparation for "Reintegration"

RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Dr. Jerome S. Peterson, Chief Medical Officer, UNRWA, approached both FAO and WHO with the request that nutrition advisors should visit the Middle East and report on the state of nutrition and the diet of the Arab refugees. It was agreed that a combined visit by staff members of these two organisations would enable the whole of this field to be covered and would produce the best results. Three previous surveys of the nutritional status of Arab refugees have been made. In 1949, Dr. M.A. Abbasy, FAO Regional Nutrition Officer in the Near East, carried out the first of these, which was limited to the Gaza area. In the spring of 1950, Dr. F.W. Clements, Chief, Nutrition Section, WHO, made a survey of refugees in all areas* and this was followed a year later by an enquiry conducted by Dr. N.L. Corkill, acting as Consultant on behalf of WHO**.

An initial meeting was held at UNRWA Headquarters on our arrival in Beirut on 26 February. A number of matters were referred to us and we were asked to advise on these at the end of the survey. The time we could spend in the refugee areas was, however, limited and we were able to go fully into only certain of these; others, such as education in nutrition and preparations for the "reintegration" of refugees could be considered only in a superficial way.

The survey started on 27 February and ended on 12 March. At the end of the survey we attended a meeting with a number of UNRWA officials and discussed our findings briefly with them.

The following centres were visited:

LEBANON — Beirut - Headquarters UNRWA

Refugee camps in Lebanon district, Saida Area

" " Baalbek, Bekaa Area

SYRIA — Damascus - Khan Es Shieh Camp; Souk Sarouja Clinic; Alliance Feeding Centre and its Children's Hospital; University of Damascus.

Dera'a - Clinics for Free Living Refugees; non-refugee school.

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* "Observations on the Nutritional Status of Arab Refugees, Feb/Mar. 1950" by F.W. Clements, World Health Organisation, Geneva, 1950.

** "Nutritional State of the Palestinian Refugees in the Spring of 1951" by N.L. Corkill, World Health Organisation, Geneva, 1951.

JORDAN — Amman - Sisters of Nazareth Children's Hospital; Zerka Medical Unit.

Jericho - Akaba Camp

Nablus - Refugee and non-refugee schools and refugee feeding canteen and clinic; Askar camp; Shweikah village; Children's Hospital, Nablus.

Jerusalem - UNRWA School, Old City; Arab Women's Infant Centre; Omarieh Government School, Old City; Freres School; Private School.

Hebron - Arroub camp; Beit-Ummar village, non-refugee school; St. Luke's Hospital, Hebron; Idna Frontier village.

EGYPT — Gaza - El Rimal Refugee Clinic; Ahl Hospital; Sajaiya Clinic; non-refugees Maghazi camp.

The numbers and the distribution of the refugees through the different countries are not given in the report. This information is available in the reports by the C.M.O. Only a limited number of places could be visited in the time at our disposal. We were able, however, to see the arrangements for the distribution of rations, supplementary meals, milk and cod liver oil, and had the opportunity of examining some 38 different groups of refugees and non-refugees; in addition we visited camps, hospitals, clinics, feeding centres and schools.

One of us (R.C. Burgess) was responsible for the medical aspects of the survey, while the other (A.G. van Veen) concentrated on the dietary side of the problem. This report has been drawn up by us jointly and we are in complete agreement on the main findings and conclusions. Part I is concerned with the medical assessment of the state of nutrition of the refugee population as a whole, with a rough comparative assessment of the condition of refugee groups living under different circumstances and with the situation among non-refugees. In Part II the basic ration, milk supplies and supplementary feeding are considered. Part III deals with a number of matters such as education in nutrition, dietary habits, food production and "re-integration".

Excellent arrangements were made for us both at Headquarters and in the Districts and we would like to express our appreciation for the willing help given us by the UNRWA staff throughout the survey. We benefited greatly from our contacts with different people in the agency and met a number of keen and thoughtful workers. We also wish to record our appreciation of help given to us by many persons outside the agency and in particular the following: Dr. W.H. Adolph, Professor of Nutrition, Medical School, University of Beirut; Dr. J. Salim, Lecturer in Pediatrics at the University of Damascus; Mr. C. Deyoe, Chief, FAO Team, Syria; Dr. Amin, S.M.O., Ph.D., Samaria.

PART I

A. ASSESSMENT OF NUTRITIONAL STATUS

(1) Mortality and Morbidity Rates

Apart from the information obtained by a clinical examination, there are other types of data which can be used to assess the nutritional status of a population. Mortality and morbidity rates in the younger age groups, for example, may give useful information as to the adequacy of food intake. Information regarding deaths in this community however is not complete. When deaths are reported the rations are reduced; this sometimes makes the refugees reluctant to report deaths; as a result mortality figures become unreliable.

In Syria, an attempt had been made before our arrival, by collecting personal histories of pregnancies, live-births, still-births and age at death of children from a large number of women and collating these data and figures, to obtain some idea of the live-birth rate, still-birth rate, neonatal rate, infantile mortality rate and death rate in the older age groups. On the basis of this investigation, the infantile mortality was estimated to be about 170 per mille and the neonatal rate about 89 per mille. A high neonatal rate such as this often occurs when the mother is not well nourished; in such circumstances, many infants die of "congenital debility". When the maternal nutritional status is good, neonatal deaths are generally fewer. This evidence is of interest and it is suggested that further investigations of the same nature would be well worthwhile for, if substantially the same findings were reported from other areas by other workers, this would help towards a more complete understanding of state of health in those communities.

Figures are available for morbidity states in the form of records of admissions to hospitals. Out of approximately 1000 refugee children admitted to the Augusta Victoria Hospital in Jerusalem, about 100 died. Nearly 40 percent were admitted for gastro-intestinal diseases and this group accounted for 73 percent of all deaths. Respiratory infections accounted for 27 percent of total admissions and 17 percent of all deaths. Diarrhoea and respiratory infections are often the principal causes of death amongst young children whose diet is inadequate.

Admissions to hospitals for frank deficiency diseases are not common, though they do occur. Among the 1000 cases admitted to the Victoria Augusta Hospital, some 5 percent showed a nutritional oedema associated with diarrhoea. Cases of diarrhoea with oedema, apathy and enlargement of the liver, which yielded very satisfactorily to treatment with skim milk, were also reported by the Consultant to the Sisters of Nazareth Children's Hospital, Amman. Cases of keratomalachia, scurvy and rickets were also seen in this hospital.

In Damascus, Dr. J. Salem, Lecturer in Pediatrics at the University of Damascus, showed us cases of xerophthalmia and scurvy as well as the records of admissions of cases of deficiency disease to hospital. In this hospital, the picture was very much the same as in Jerusalem and Amman.

Refugees comprise only a proportion of the total admissions to this hospital. In the children's hospital in Nablus, we saw two cases of rickets and a record of admissions similar to that found in the hospitals mentioned above.

(2) Body Weights and Growth Rates

A large number of records of birth weights were obtained from one centre. The mean weights at birth were as follows:

Male..... 3.45 kilos

Female..... 3.40 "

A smaller number of records from other centres gave somewhat higher figures - 3.6 kilos for males and 3.5 kilos for females. These figures are comparable with the birth weights in the more highly developed countries. It appears that a reduction in birth weight is usually found only when there is a low caloric intake.

The rate of growth is much lower than the rate which is regarded as normal for the healthy infant in highly developed countries. We obtained some interesting records from the Arab Women clinic in Jerusalem. When the average weight at different ages is estimated from these records, the weight of a few months old infant is found to compare with the standard used in Europe but, by the time he is 18 months old, he is 2.5 kilos lighter. Although it cannot accepted without further proof that this slower rate is due to malnutrition, this is the most likely cause.

A further analysis of these figures would be of value. If, for example, individual records were plotted showing the scatter, this would indicate whether the general rate of growth is slow or whether a proportion of infants grow at a higher rate and the average is lowered by a considerable number of poorly growing infants. The impression was gained that gastro-intestinal upsets are frequent and have far-reaching effects on the growth of the infant. These may be caused originally by infection or simply mechanically, i.e. by food which is unsuitable for the child's incompletely developed digestive system; moreover, once diarrhoea has started, the ingestion of unsuitable food is likely to cause it to persist. In the course of discussions with doctors in charge of clinics and hospitals, we found it to be an unanimous opinion that injudicious feeding was an important primary cause of malnutrition in infants. Some doctors thought it was directly responsible for some 60-70 percent of cases of malnutrition seen by them. Enquiries showed that it was common for the mother to start giving small amounts of food from the family meals to the infant when he was about three months old; anything might be given - fried food, coffee, etc. - without discrimination.

It was suggested (Clements - 1950) that in the refugee population the maternal diet may not be sufficiently adequate to allow the mother to feed her child properly. This may well be so. Analysis of figures such

as those available in Jerusalem might throw some further light on this problem. Records of the increase in weight of breast-fed infants who have escaped the hazard of intestinal upset would indicate whether their mothers had been able to feed them adequately. A view which we found to be general among doctors and nurses who dealt directly with the people was that, provided the mother was intelligent and prepared to follow advice, the infant grew in a satisfactory manner.

A number of individual weights of children are available, but unfortunately, ages are not known and these data are only of limited value. It would be worthwhile to weigh the same children again in a year's time to ascertain the percentage increase in weight for that period. An increase of about 10 per cent occurs in well-fed children.

(3) Clinical Examinations

The examination of large numbers of individuals was confined to infants and children. Some adults were examined but little evidence of malnutrition was found. With the exception of pregnant and lactating women, adults do not so readily show clinical evidence of dietary deficiencies. This is particularly so if they have been reasonably well-fed previously as was probably the case among these people. Apart from the fact that such adults have considerable body reserves of certain essentials, the adult refugee population is not in the present circumstances called upon to do regular work and their energy expenditure is therefore relatively small. The young child on the other hand has had few opportunities to build up reserves, is as active as circumstances allow and, above all, is growing fast.

The youngest children in the schools comprised the largest number examined. This is the youngest age group which can be conveniently assembled together. It was our intention in making the survey to compare (a) the refugee population in camps; (b) the refugee population not in camps, and (c) non-refugee populations. As far as pre-school children are concerned, it was possible to assemble these in the camps, but this was not always feasible in the other groups.

A comparison has therefore been made between the different groups based on the findings among the youngest school children, but errors may well arise in making such a comparison. The children in the camp schools are likely to be representative of the main refugee population, but the non-refugee children may not be equally representative of the population from which they are drawn.

It appears that a smaller proportion of the latter attend school and experience elsewhere leads one to suspect that children who attend school may be above the general standard of the community they represent, for they are likely to come from families with an economic and social status which is above the average.

A comparison of the state of nutrition among schoolboys and schoolgirls may be subject to error for the same reason. The education of girls is a relatively recent introduction in these communities and fewer girls than boys attend school. The chances are that the former have the most enlightened and intelligent parents in the community and they are probably better fed than average children.

Criteria of nutritional status - The clinical examination was made by a rapid method. This consisted in the first place of a general assessment on the basis of an inspection of the individual in which the following were taken into account: the general appearance of health and intelligence or their opposites; brightness of the expression of the eye; the texture of skin; the condition of the hair; posture.

The skeleton was then examined for evidence of enlargement of the ends of the long bones, frontal bossing, beaded ribs, etc. This was followed by a rapid individual examination of the superficial tissues including the hair, the eyes, the epithelium, the muco-cutaneous junctures, the buccal mucous membranes and the skin. Search was made for enlargement of the parotid gland and the liver and for the presence of demonstrable oedema. A schedule based on previous findings was used for recording these data.

This general assessment revealed relatively few refugee children who could be described as badly nourished. One of the worst groups was in an area where the population was entirely dependent on rations supplied by UNRWA and here 12 per cent were placed in the badly nourished category. Among non-refugees [in frontier villages] 60 per cent in one area and 75 per cent in another area were assessed as badly nourished; among

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these children, enlarged parotid glands, enlarged livers and oedema were found.

In the routine examination of the skeleton, occasional evidence of healed rickets was found. The signs noted were frontal bossing, beading of the ribs and enlarged epiphyses in the long bones.

In the rapid examination of the superficial tissues, the following were looked for:

Eyes: Thickening of the conjunctive, xerophthalmia and Bitots spots. None of these signs were common. In every area visited we were able to demonstrate the presence of indisputable Bitots spots. As will be described later, there was other evidence of the occurence of deficiency of Vitamin A in the populations surveyed. In the examination of the eye, it was not possible, because of lack of time, to look for vadcularisation of the cornea. This sign is considered by some workers to be associated with riboflavin deficiency, but other workers doubt this. Trachoma is widespread in this area and, while there may be some grounds for the argument that invasion of the cornea by blood vessels occurs in trachoma only when this disease is also associated with riboflavin deficiency, it is undoubtedly a common finding in trachoma in different parts of the world.

(b) Abnormalities of the lips and tongue - angular stomatitis, cheilosis and enlargement of the tongue papillae, fissuring, and the so-called "geographical" tongue, occurred frequently. Changed in the tongue were not however as conspicuous as those in the lips. It is probable that these abnormalities indicate a deficiency of one or more vitamins grouped together in the Vitamin B complex.

(c) Abnormalities of the gums. - These varied from gums normal in appearance but which bled on slight pressure to an advanced infective condition in which there was chronic inflammation, recession, absorption of the inter-dental papillae and very often a free flow of pus from the pockets. In the examination made in the survey, only bleeding was recorded. The cause of these conditions is not understood. They occur more readily where there is malocclusion of the teeth and also in children with adenoids causing mouth breathing. Vitamin C deficiency may play a part, but soft food, lack of stimulation of the gums and consequent absence of a cleansing effect may also be of importance.

(d) Abnormalities of the skin were: xerosis; keratotic changes in the sebaceous follicles; and mosaic skin. Occasionally, a

marked pigmentation was noticed; this appeared to occur most often among children who were classified as below normal in the general assessment. The exact nature of all these skin changes is not clear but they are in general known to be rare among the well-to-do and more common among the poor. The follicular change in the sebaceous gland may be due to (a) a deficiency of Vitamin A or more probably to (b) a deficiency of essential fatty acids. The other skin changes have been attributed to deficiency of specific nutrients but there is little reliable evidence in support of these views. It does however appear to be clear that an inadequate diet is an important factor in the causation of the various skin lesions observed.

Only among non-refugees in an obvious ill-nourished condition did we find enlargement of the liver and parotid glands. Frank oedema was seen only in a few non-refugee children.

General findings in the refugee population as a whole

We have outlined above the data on which it is possible to base an assessment of the state of nutrition of the refugees as a whole. We shall now review it briefly and draw certain broad conclusions.

The information obtained from the statistical survey carried out in Syria is of interest but needs confirmation by a further survey. In populations suffering from malnutrition, prematurity in infants is common; it is the large proportion of premature babies, together with their high fatality in the first few weeks of life, which produced the high neonatal death rate in under-fed populations. The mean weight at birth, figures for which were obtained from a number of different centres, gives the impression that prematurity is not common but this requires further investigation. More information is needed and no conclusions can be drawn from the existing evidence.

With reference to morbidity, the high incidence of gastro-intestinal disease is of importance. Its association with malnutrition cannot be doubted but it appears possible that in the population surveyed the malnutrition is often a result of the intestinal upset. The impression we have is that refugee mothers can feed their babies successfully and that if they are prepared to make use of the facilities offered them in the form of milk, they can wean their babies and give them a good start in life. If these facilities or some adequate substitutes are not available or not made use of, cases of malnutrition in infancy are likely to occur.

Hospital records show that children suffering from deficiency of calories and protein are sometimes admitted; it appears, however, that such conditions are usually secondary to intestinal upsets and are limited to infants. Clinical evidence of these deficiencies was not found among the refugees examined in the camps.

From the cases seen in hospital and the records of admissions to hospital, it is evident that rickets and keratomalacia occur in refugee

children. The clinical examinations produced further evidence to support this finding. Rickets would appear to be due to the practice of wrapping the infant up in abundant clothing, but may also be partly due to the social custom which requires the mother also to wear abundant clothing which in turn means that the infant inherits low reserves of Vitamin D.

Mild Vitamin A deficiency appears to be fairly common. Complaints of night blindness in children were numerous and careful consideration of the circumstances in which they were made left little doubt that some at least of these cases were genuine. This evidence, taken in conjunction with the fact that signs of Vitamin A deficiency are to be found in the general population and that frank cases are admitted to hospital strongly suggests that Vitamin A deficiency is of some importance in the refugee community. An important factor in its production may be the low Vitamin A intake of the mother, resulting in the infant being born with very low reserves of the vitamin in his body. Intestinal upsets or unsuitable feeding may precipitate the acute deficiency condition which occurs in early infancy.

Bleeding gums are common and there are records of occasional cases of scurvy being admitted to hospital. We are in some doubt as to the significance of bleeding gums and are by no means sure that Vitamin C deficiency is widespread. The occurrence of even a small number of frank cases indicates that there is a risk of this deficiency.

Two further groups of signs are common. The first of these is angular stomatitis, cheilosis and tongue changes. These are probably due to deficiency of various members of the Vitamin B group. They are common in many parts of the world in which the diet consists largely of foods rich in carbohydrate with small amounts of supplementary foods.

Lastly there were certain abnormalities in the skin which are further evidence that the diet is not adequate in all respects although it is good enough to prevent gross malnutrition under the circumstances in which these people are living.

B. REFUGEES LIVING UNDER DIFFERENT CONDITIONS

We have so far presented only a general picture of the nutritional state of the refugee population. In this large group of people with differing backgrounds and living in different areas and under different conditions, considerable variation is to be expected in the ways in which they have managed to reorganise their lives. For example, opportunities for earning money vary a great deal from place to place.

In some urban or semi-urban areas a relatively small number of refugees appear to be able to feed and clothe their children remarkably well. Such children show relatively few signs of deficiency disease. In the table below data relating to children in the camps in Saida where means of supplementing income appeared to be more readily available

than in any other camp we visited, are compared with data obtained in the examination of similar groups of refugees in Gaza.

	Saida Number 80	Rimal Number 100
Classified as of indifferent physique	9 %	16 %
Angular Stomatitis and Cheilosis	18 %	51 %
Gum changes	11 %	17 %
Skin changes	16 %	35 %

We gained the impression that the children in some camps are a good deal better off than refugee children outside camps in the same areas. This might well be related to the fact that part of the rations are sold to obtain money for rent and to cover other expenses which the people in camps are not required to meet.

We found a high incidence of deficiency conditions in the Wavell and Gourand Camps. Clements in 1950 reported the same finding and explained it on the ground that the people in this cold and exposed area had higher calorie requirements (which the basic ration did not fulfil) than the refugees in the more sheltered camps. He argued that the former would supplement with foods of high calorie value whenever they were in a position to do so, rather than by foodstuffs which would be a good source of nutrients. Corkill (1951) also expressed the same opinion and we are in agreement with the views of both these workers.

C. NON-REFUGEES

No serious malnutrition was found in any of the refugee groups but this cannot be said of the non-refugee population. For the purposes of this report, non-refugees may be divided roughly into three groups: first, the large population that has been relatively little affected by the influx of refugees; second, the people whose source of income has been interfered with; and third, agriculturists living on the frontier who have lost land or are no longer able to earn money working on land now in Israel.

The first non-refugees we saw were the children of parents in the second group who had largely lost their source of income. We had an opportunity to speak to the parents themselves. They volunteered the information that the children were not properly fed, and this was borne out in clinical examination. The following is an example of the type of story a great number of these people had to tell. One man had, before the influx of the refugees, a small shop, which had brought in no very

large income but which provided for the needs of himself and his family. Shortly after their arrival, refugees commenced selling in the street the same goods as he stocked and at prices much lower than his. In a short time he was ruined. The refugees got their food, houses, and water supply free. He had to pay for all of these. In Gaza we were told that an enquiry had shown that out of approximately 90,000 non-refugees, 60,000 had no source of income and there is little doubt that a large section of this is dependent to a greater or lesser extent on the refugee and his ration. We found the non-refugee in this area a good deal worse off than the refugee.

We visited two frontier villages where we found extremely bad conditions. Here 75 percent of children were classified as badly nourished, and we observed famine oedema, enlarged livers and di-pigmented hair associated with persistent diarrhoea, stunted growth and apathy among the children. We visited the houses of these people and searched them with no opposition whatsoever from the indifferent depressed occupants. There was virtually no food in the house except a few green leaves that had been collected on the day of our investigation and a small amount of the coarse husk and millings from sorghum which is usually not considered suitable for human food. An abnormally high number of deaths appears to have occurred recently in these villages and it is probable that there will be many more. This problem appears to us to be urgent. In comparison with these villagers the refugees are rather well off, because at least they receive the basic ration.

PART II

(1) EVALUATION OF BASIC RATION IN RELATION TO PRESENT NUTRITIONAL STATUS

In the "Report of the Palestine Arab Refugee Problem" of L.B.Kirk and M.A.Abbasy* a Temporary Maintenance Diet was drawn up which would provide 2,200 calories, 63 gms. protein (including some animal protein) and 35 gms. fat. Financial and supply difficulties soon made it necessary to reduce this ration to one providing about 1,600 calories and 40 gms. protein with no animal protein. The ration has remained at this level; moreover, although it was expected that the emergency period would be relatively short, it has lasted for several years. At the present time, the ration is made up of the following kinds and amounts of food.

	Grams per person per day
Flour	325 - 350
Lentils (or legumes)	22
Rice	15
Oil and margarine	10 - 13
Sugar	16

Sometimes small quantities of fish, and dates, are included.

It will be noted that this ration does not provide vegetables, fruits or salt, which are components of a normal diet. Furthermore the refugees do not receive money with which to buy these items. The impression was gained that during the period from 1948-1951 when voluntary agencies (e.g. Society of American Friends, Comité International de la Croix Rouge, League of Red Cross Societies) were operating, there was some provision for foods in addition to the basic ration.

It is evident that, at the present time, the refugees have to trade a substantial part of their basic ration to get vegetables, fruits, salts, etc. Also, they have to pay the bakers for making their bread; this sometimes amounts to 10 per cent of the numbers of loaves baked. In the cities a part of the ration is probably sometimes used for paying rent. For these reasons there is a marked difference between the amount of food "supplied" and "consumed". Nevertheless, there appears to be no undernutrition among the adults due to a shortage of calories or protein. (See Part I).

As stated before the refugees living in cold areas and in the more exposed camps have higher calorie needs than those living under less rigorous conditions. We would like to stress the importance of implementing the recommendation of Clements and Corkill (l.c.) as soon as possible. From an organizational point of view, it could be done rather easily. The extra allocation, in the form of "high extraction" wheat flour for example, could well be extended to other isolated places such as camps or villages where a real food shortage may appear at the end of the month.

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* FAO, Washington D.C., September 1948.

The Supply Section of UNRWA has been able to procure the basic ration for less than $2 per person per month. Although in principle we do not favour the inclusion of white flour and white rice in the basic ration, we realize that these commodities have a good trading value. They are often traded for "high extraction" flour, which the refugees generally prefer. The refugee population seems to have adapted itself well to the basic ration and knows how to make good use of it. For these reasons we do not recommend a change in the basic ration.

However, when a group of refugees is "reintegrated", extra food should be provided for a certain period of time for muscular rehabilitation in order to prepare them for agricultural or other heavy work to which they are not now accustomed.

(2) MILK SUPPLY AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS

UNICEF still supplies about 420,000 rations of dried skim milk; the distribution program is fully in the hands of UNRWA. In 1951 UNICEF envisaged a reduction in the number of milk rations; fortunately, this has not yet materialized.*

Vulnerable groups (infants, children up to 15 years of age, pregnant and nursing women) have higher requirements for certain nutrients than the rest of the population. A large part of these higher requirements (especially for good quality protein, calcium and riboflavin) is met by the UNICEF milk supply only, not by the "basic ration". Withdrawal of this milk supply would seriously impair the nutritional status of the vulnerable groups, and nutritional deficiencies (e.g. protein, riboflavin, etc.) would doubtless appear. There would be danger of "kwashiorkor", a disease which is associated with a lack of good quality protein in the diet, and which occurs principally among children from the time of weaning until about five years of age.** We would like to emphasize the fact that milk is essential in UNRWA's feeding program for the vulnerable groups; without it, the present food supply would be very inadequate, and would have disastrous effects on the nutritional status of these groups.

From the technical standpoint, it is highly desirable that the milk distribution program should remain in international hands. Otherwise it would be difficult to organize distribution in the four countries as efficiently as it is now done. Moreover there is often some tension between refugees and the local population which would create difficulties for local organizations to undertake the program.

Milk is generally provided for the 0 - 2 years old and the school children. This practice has great value and should be encouraged. The problems are the pre-school child and the child not attending school. These groups are difficult to reach especially in towns and villages. Many milk rations are not taken, due largely to the location of the centre and the weather. The pre-school child, however, is extremely vulnerable. We would like to stress this point and to recommend that in health surveys the medical staff give special attention to the nutritional status of this age-group.

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* Apart from the milk distributed by UNICEF, some 10,000 rations are issued by the American Middle East Relief to refugees in the Gaza area. There is no other milk distribution for the refugees.

** This is why we have stressed the necessity of registering the newborn, and allotting them milk rations, so that they will get good quality protein after weaning.

Up to the present time, milk conservation plans have not been developed. The refugees (c.q. UNRWA) form a valuable group of potential consumers, who might help to put milk conservation in this region on its feet. We would like to draw the attention of UNICEF and of UNRWA to this matter.

It is not certain how long it will be possible to provide sufficient imported dried milk for the refugees; supplies of the product are limited at the present time and prices are relatively high. Therefore practical research on milk substitutes should be initiated on a pilot basis either in Beirut (in cooperation with Professor Adolph and others) or in Damascus (with Dr. Salim, Dr. Almarachi and others). This could be done along the lines of the work of Dr. R. F. Dean in Western Germany and Dr. Caprino in Italy after the second world war; their work showed that a combination of cereals, which have been malted, and pulses, such as soya, may be of great value in child nutrition. UNICEF might be interested in assisting projects of this nature; the Nutrition Division of FAO would be prepared to give technical advice. Such work would also be of value in preparing the refugees for "reintegration".

We are in favour of the present practices of boiling fresh milk prior to consumption and of turning skim milk into "leban". Occasionally improper preparation may result in a product which causes infant diarrhoea (especially in summer) but generally speaking the risks to health are small and milk in this form is most acceptable.

Dried skim milk sometimes becomes caked, and is difficult to reconstitute by ordinary methods. We found that in the milk centres it is not generally known that caked milk dissolves much better in hot than in cold water, or that it is often helpful to first prepare a soft dough of it, and to dilute this gradually with more water. The addition of 0,01 - 0,1 % sodium carbonate or bicarbonate (calculated on final volume) under vigorous stirring is often very helpful. Caked milk can also be used successfully in porridges (burghul dishes), bread and biscuits.

Some milk centres have initiated programs of education in hygiene and in nutrition; we would like to stress their importance, since mothers and children can easily be given instruction when they come to the centres to obtain their milk.

(3) SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING PROGRAM. (WELFARE RATIONS)

This program is intended to supply extra protective foods to the most needy of the vulnerable groups. It is very important since the basic ration and the milk supply together are not always sufficient to cover the nutritional requirements of these groups. (See Part I). At the present time only about 3% of the total refugee population of 900,000 obtains extra rations. The others have to supplement their diet by whatever means they can. This figure of 3% is very low. IRO was able to supply from 5 - 6 % of its refugee population with extra meals. We recommend that in a few areas, such as isolated camps and some villages for "free-living" refugees where the nutritional status, according to the medical officers is unsatisfactory, the percentage should be increased to 5 or 6%.

Since at least the number receiving extra rations would be small, we recommend that they should be issued only on medical certificate and for no longer than one to two months at a time.

In some areas the rations are given to children in some schools for an indefinite period of time, while in other schools no provision is made; sometimes there is no provision for pre-school children. We would again like to draw attention to the pre-school children in towns and villages who are more difficult to reach than those in camps.

At the present time a few centres provide supplementary feeding for all weaned infants up to two years of age. It would be advisable to extnnd the service to this group to all centres, providing it did not interfere with the present programs for older children. We recommend that this matter be given careful study.

The aged have lower nutritional requirements than adults generally. They should receive extra rations only on medical certificate. In many cases their need is for a more digestible ration rather than a supplementary one.

The organization of the supplementary feeding programs varies from country to country. For example, in Gaza and Lebanon, theSocial Welfare Division on UNRWA is in charge of the feeding centres; in Syria, the Medical Division; in Jordan, infants up to two years of age are in the care of the Medical Division, while older children are the responsibility of the Social Welfare Division. It is impossible to judge which solution is the best from the organizational standpoint. The programs in Gaza and in Syria are both functioning well. However, it is evident that there must be close collaboration between the SocialWelfare and the Medical Divisions.

The supplementary feeding program should be designed to provide the nutrients which are lacking in the diet (basic ration and milk). It should be in the form of "protective" and "acceptable" foods. At the present time it consists of :

1. some foods from the basic ration (e.g. flour, rice, pulses, sugar, oil) which for convenience will be designated as HQ supplies (see Appendix).

2. foods which can be bought locally for an amount equal to 40 U.S. cents per person per month.

This supplementary ration provides about 500-600 calories, and from the standpoint of calories it is sufficient.

The following observations were made during our survey of a number of feeding centres when it was possible to collect data on available foods and their local market prices :

1. White rice is expensive, especially in relation to its nutritive value and its place in the supplementary meal. It has no trade value because it is supplied in the cooked form.

2. In many centres white "low extraction" wheat flour is supplied. This has no supplementary value. If "high extraction" flour cannot be provided by HQ, it should be made available locally. All bread in the Near East is manufactured from "high extraction" flour (± 86%).

The relatively small amount of "high extraction" flour which would be needed would not upset the local marketing system. On the other hand it should not be difficult for HQ to procure some 60 tons per month.

3. It was frequently stated that the daily amounts of pulses (30 grams), sugar (20 grams), oil (15 grams) are too high for a meal of 500-600 calories, of which a part consists of bread.

The supplementary ration should consist of some "high extraction" flour, pulses, some meat, eggs, (or fish, especially in Lebanon and Gaza), green leafy vegetables or green pulses; and fruits. Oil and sugar should be supplied only in moderate quantities. A reduction of the HQ supplies is therefore recommended since it would make more money available for local buying. It is possible that some items from the reduced HQ supply might better be bought locallyin certain seasons, if the local prices are sufficiently low. (In the Appendix an example is given of how modifications might be made).

The supplementary meal can have beneficial effects only if it is ensured that the milk ration, which supplies nutrients (e.g. good quality protein, calcium and riboflavin) in which the diet is otherwise lacking, is consumed. We draw the attention of UNRWA to this important point.

The modifications in the supplementary meal can be effective only if there is adequate supervision of the feeding centres and kitchens. Expert advice should be provided to ensure that the available money will procure local foods which have a high nutritive value to "supplement" the basic diet and which are at the same time acceptable to the consumers. We therefore recommend that UNRWA should employ a non-medical nutritionist (dietician type). This person should regularly visit the different feeding centres to inspect and advise on the program and to train personnel. It would also be one of the tasks of the nutritionist to determine the combination of foods most suitable in different areas and in different seasons.

Cod Liver oil The vitamin A content of the present UNICEF supplies of cod liver oil is not known; it is therefore difficult to determine its preventive or therapeutic value. In some centres few difficulties are encountered in giving cod liver oil; in others the situation is quite different. In one or two centres an attempt has been made to incorporate cod liver oil in cakes, so as to make it more acceptable. An investigation should, however, be made as to whether there is significant destruction of vitamin A during the preparation. In theory, a supplementary feeding program which includes certain vegetables and fruits in sufficient quantity should eliminate any danger of a shortage of pro-vitamin A. However, at the present time, the supplementary feeding programs do not assure adequate quantities of pro-vitamin A for either mothers or children. It has already been pointed out that digestive troubles caused by improper feeding impair the absorption of this vitamin from the intestinal tract. We therefore recommend that the supply of good grade cod liver oil be continued. In addition to vitamin A, it is a rich source of vitamin D, for which there is a need. In hospitals and for therapeutic purposes, cheap synthetic vitamin A concentrates (1,000,000 I.U for 15 U.S.cents) might be supplied. These products have the disadvantage that, when diluted, they are less stable than cod liver oil and they do not contain vitamin D. They should not be used in the feeding centres. Mothers should be taught the importance of sunshine for their infants and young children, in connection with the occurrence of rickets, which appears to be common.

Multi-purpose food which was donated to UNRWA has been used in some of the feeding programs. Opinions differ as to its acceptability. We would like to point out that if it is desired to purchase soy preparations, the cost of multi-purpose food in comparison with that of other soy products is high. For example, defatted soyflour would be preferable.

As is the case in the milk centres, the feeding centres should be utilized for education in nutrition and health. Attention should be given to the training of personnel. In many of the centres visited, the personnel had no knowledge of nutritive values, e.g. the relatively low nutritive value of squashes and marrows as compared with other available vegetables. Mothers should be taught which foods are most important and how they can best be prepared. Education of mothers in the feeding of weaned infants is extremely important. It is equally important in preparing mothers for "reintegration"; later on it will be more difficult to reach them.

Tomato juice - Tomatoes are abundant in certain areas and in certain seasons. They are rich in pro-vitamin A and in as bic acid and are suitable for infant and child feeding. We would like to suggest that the possibilities of establishing a small tomato juice plant in the Jordan Valley or elsewhere should be investigated. The present and potential tomato production would require study. Containers would not be too serious a problem because used bottles, etc. could be returned by the feeding centres and hospitals to the factory. If tomatoes were available at a low price for such a plant, it would be possible to make tomato juice available either to hospitals for infant feeding or to UNRWA for its feeding program. The attention of UNICEF should be drawn to this suggestion since it is interested in assisting food processing projects which have a direct bearing on child nutrition. FAO would be prepared to give any technical advice needed.

PART III

OTHER MATTERS

(1) Education

A beginning has already been made with education through schools and by various media such as radio and films. Simple education in health, sanitation, nutrition, agriculture, horticulture, the raising of milk cattle, etc. is of immediate practical value, as well as of great importance in preparing for "reintegration". In the sections on "Milk" and "Supplementary Meals", we have made some recommendations regarding the teaching of mothers and children. We recommend that simple education in nutrition should be included in Maternal and Child Health programs and in schools.

We would like to stress the importance of practical programs for the refugees who, to a large extent, were, and in the future will be, agriculturists. We were impressed by the almost complete absence of gardens in most camps. They could not only provide employment and be of educational value, but they would increase the supply of vegetables. There should be expert advice regarding the kinds of vegetables that should be grown. Instruction in gardening, cattle raising, etc. should be in accordance with traditional methods where they are feasible. Where better results could be achieved by other methods, they should be introduced, e.g. the newer methods for growing vegetables in dry and arid areas. Instruction should be given by teachers who know the people, and also their own field of activity thoroughly; local teachers should be drawn in as much as possible. Gardens and small agricultural plots in camps and villages should be developed; also demonstration areas from which technicians, local teachers, and refugees alike would profit.

We regret that time did not permit us to go into more detail regarding education programs.

(2) Food Habits

Of great importance, now and for "reintegration" is the preservation of the many good food habits common among the refugees. These include the preference for high extraction wheat flour; the eating of burghul (parboiled wheat) mixed with meat, pulses, and vegetables; the use of milk (or leban) and the more or less regular consumption of pulses, vegetables and fruits. Among the poor habits requiring modification are the giving of unsuitable foods to infants after weaning, and keeping the children out of the sun and too fully clothed.

(3) General Food Production

From the nutrition point of view this is less important under present conditions than it is for the period of "reintegration". We would like to point out, however, that, with proper management and irrigation, the soil of the region as a whole offers great possibilities. From the Food Balance Sheets of FAO and from talks with agriculturists, it is apparent that at the present time there is a rather substantial production of cereals, pulses and milk. The impression was gained, however, that the potential agricultural production in the Lebanon, Gaza and Jordan is limited. Agricultural planning, especially in relation to "reintegration" should as far

as soil and climate permit, be correlated with the nutritional needs and food habits of the groups to be "reintegrated".

(4) Preparation for Reintegration

This important matter requires knowledge of what to prepare the refugees for and how. We have to deal with groups who subsisted in the past almost entirely on agriculture. Some of them are now living in large cities, where they are gradually adjusting themselves to a new mode of life, and learning handicrafts and other occupations remote from agriculture. This is also true for the refugees living in camps in the vicinity of large cities and towns. There are also groups of "free living" refugees in villages, who have little employment and who are slowly deteriorating in mind and body. A third group is the camp population (about one third of the 900,000 refugees) which is deteriorating even more rapidly than the second group. This is especially true in the isolated camps, where there is very little employment and very little opportunity for "adjusting" the diet by trading a part of the basic ration.

If the refugees, especially those living in villages and far off camps, are to be prepared for "reintegration", they must be educated in a practical way in matters relating to agriculture and nutrition. Therefore demonstration areas and gardens should be started as soon as possible. Some land should be obtained near villages and camps, either by buying, or by renting it. Some physical work would help to prevent the moral, mental and physical deterioration which was so well known among prisoners-of-war and in internee camps during and after the last war.

If "reintegration" on a large scale is to take place, it will be necessary to consider the optimal population density in certain areas in relation to its agricultural production possibilities (quality of soil, possibilities for irrigation, etc.).

A great deal will have to be done to ensure good health and good nutritional status of the new society. Plans will have to be made, which take into consideration agricultural production including factors such as irrigation, cash crops, etc., dairy products, horticulture and fish cultivation, etc., food storage, distribution, marketing, food processing, nutrition and health education.

This integrated planning demands not only close cooperation among the different sections of UNRWA, but also with local and all U.N. agencies active in the region (FAO, WHO, Point IV, UNICEF, etc.). Cooperative planning should be done for the area as a whole, not for individual countries only. Account should be taken of the achievements which are made in one country, since they may have important practical applications elsewhere.

Only by having a comprehensive plan and by making use of all international and local technicians can we foresee a practical solution to the refugee problems with some reasonable guarantee for the most efficient linking together of agricultural production, the raising of standards of living, and levels of health and nutrition.

A P P E N D I X

The following suggestions for a revision of the supplementary meal are made on the basis of present local prices, which do not differ much in the different areas. This should be regarded as an example only.

a) HQ supplies per capita per month (= 26 days)

Flour should consist of "high extraction" wheat flour - 2 kg.

Rice to be reduced from 0.6 to 0.0 kg.

Pulses to be reduced from 0.5 to 0.125 kg.

Oil to be reduced from 0.35 to 0.125 kg.

The cost of the HQ supply would be reduced from L. Syrian 2.9 to about LS 1.4 per capita, a difference of LS 1.5. LS 1.5 plus 1.8 (now available for buying) would then be available for local buying.

The following foods could be bought for about LS 2 per month:

b) 13 eggs
0.6 kg. green leafy vegetables (or young, green pulses)
0.6 kg. tomatoes

a) plus b) would give, over a period of one month (26 feeding days) 440 calories and 16 grams protein per person per day. There would still be sufficient money left (about LS 1.3) with which to buy more calories, protein or other nutrients (e.g. either more "high extraction" wheat flour, local pulses, more sugar or oil or more vegetables and fruits). For example, the following foods per person per month could be bought for LS 1.1:

c) 1 kg. pulses and/or wheat
0.6 kg. green leafy vegetables
0.6 kg. tomatoes

They would provide one person per day about 135 calories and from 4 to 8 gms. protein.

d) The fact should be taken into account that the milk ration of 40 gms. per person per day already provides another 140 calories and 14 gms. of protein.

Some white rice might still be provided. Eggs could sometimes be substituted by meat or fish, but only in small quantities, since their prices are high.

Lists of foodstuffs which could substitute for one another in terms of nutritive values and prices should be drawn up, and it should be pointed out which foods are, from a nutritional viewpoint, a waste of money (e.g. squashes and marrows).

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations given below under A relate to the collection of data of value in assessing the general health of the refugee population, in particular the relationship of health to food intake. Those under B are concerned with measures to improve the diet.

A. Assessment of State of Nutrition

(1) The investigation of pregnancies and still-births which was carried out in Syria should be extended and repeated in other areas.

(2) The birth weights of refugee infants may be compared with those of the infants of paying patients in hospitals.

(3) The records of growth of infants in MCH centres should be carefully analysed; they may throw light on the adequacy or otherwise of the diet of the infants.

(4) School-children whose weights are already on record should be weighed again in order to determine tha rate of increase in weight.

(5) The weights of a sufficient number of adults of comparable ages in the different groups may be investigated. This may indicate whether or not there is any particular need for more calories in any one group.

(6) The practice of looking for signs of deficiency conditions in the course of medical examinations should be continued and developed. In the near future a schedule will be made available with notes attached which may facilitate the assessment and recording of deficiency states.

B. Dietary measures

(1) The ration

(i) It is recommended, for reasons given in the report, that the "basic ration" should remain unchanged.

(ii) The recommendation already made by Clements and Corkill that refugees living in cold and exposed areas should have more food, is repeated.

(2) Milk

(i) There should be no reduction in the supply of milk to the vulnerable groups and special attention should be paid to the needs of infants after weaning and to those of pre-school children. For a number of reasons we recommend the present arrangement for the distribution of milk to be continued.

(ii) There is nothing to object to in the usual practice of the refugees of turning the skim milk into leban.

(iii) The refugee population forms an important group of potential milk consumers; therefore the development of milk conservation projects in the region is strongly recommended.

(iv) The study of foods and food preparations which can serve as partial substitutes for milk is recommended. This may be initiated in Beirut or Damascus.

(3) Supplementary Meals

(i) In areas in which, according to the medical officers, the nutritional status of a part of the population is not satisfactory, the number of supplementary meals - now fixed at the number needed to supply 3 percent of the refugee population - should be increased.

(ii) Supplementary meals should be issued only when a medical certificate is given and for a period not exceeding 1-2 months. It is desirable that all weaned infants up to 2 years of age should receive supplementary meals. Care should be taken to ensure that those who get supplementary meals also get their milk ration.

(iii) Certain changes in the composition of the supplementary meals, and also in the procurement of the ingredients composing them, are recommended.

(iv) We recommend the employment by UNRWA of a non-medical nutritionist to give expert advice on nutrition matters affecting the refugees and to educate and supervise the personnel employed in the feeding and milk centres.

(v) Consideration should be given to the building of a small plant for the manufacture of tomato-juice for infants, for hospital patients and for others.

(vi) The supply of cod-liver oil should be continued.

(4) Education

(i) Simple education in nutrition and health should be given to the refugees in feeding centres, milk distribution centres and schools and also through Maternity and Child Welfare programs. In this connection, the value of encouraging the cultivation of gardens by the refugees is stressed. In planning

education in nutrition, account should be taken of the various good food dietary habits which already exist in the population concerned.

(ii) A broad educational program is needed. This should be of a practical nature - designed not only to prevent further physical, mental and moral deterioration in the refugee population, and to effect certain immediate improvements in the situation, but also to prepare the refugees for the future. Demonstration areas, the cultivation of gardens, measures to enable the refugees to practise some agriculture and to raise some cattle (particularly milk cattle) should all have an important place in this program.

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WHO-FAO SURVEY SHOWS NO SERIOUS MALNUTRITION AMONG PALESTINE REFUGEES;
IMPROVED FEEDING OF INFANTS RECOMMENDED

(The following was received at UN Headquarters from WHO, Geneva. Although delayed, it is issued for reference purposes.)

No serious malnutrition was found among Arab refugees from Palestine living in surrounding Arab countries during the latest and most extensive investigation carried out jointly by the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

The report has been made jointly by Professor A.G. van Veen, a senior official of FAO, and Dr. R.C. Burgess, who heads the nutrition section of WHO, after a two-weeks visit in refugee camps, feeding centers, hospitals, schools and clinics in the Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Gaza strip of Egypt.

Their report, which has just been completed, agrees generally with the findings of earlier WHO investigations made in the spring of 1950 and 1951.

It says: "We visited two frontier villages where ..... 75 per cent of children were classified as badly nourished. In comparison with these villagers the refugees are rather well off, because at least they receive the basic ration" (of 1,600 calories and 40 grams protein).

The report recommends higher rations for refugees living in the colder and more exposed camps. While it commends the "good food habits" among adult refugees, it makes a series of recommendations to improve the feeding of infants, school children and other "vulnerable" categories from the nutritional point of view. Supplementary feeding programs of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, consisting mainly of milk supplies for mothers and children, are "essential" in the general feeding programs for the refugees, according to the report, but doctors in charge of clinics and hospitals were found unanimous in the opinion that "injudicious feeding was an important primary cause of malnutrition in infants."

The report adds: "Inquiries showed that it was common for the mother to start giving small amounts of food from the family meals to the infant when it was about three months old; anything might be given - fried food, coffee, etc. - without discrimination."

(more)

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To remedy this situation the investigators recommended a general extension of the practice at some milk centers to give instructions on infant feeding to the mothers when they came to obtain their milk. In addition, mothers should be taught the importance of exposing their infants and young children to the sun to prevent rickets which are caused, according to the report, by the practice of wrapping the infant up in abundant clothing.

Practical studies of milk substitutes for mothers and children are recommended in the report, particularly because the indefinite continuation of skim milk supplies from international sources is not certain. FAO would be prepared to give technical advice on methods of amaking available suitable substitutes, which might include malted cereals and pulses such as soya.

Doctors and nurses dealing directly with the refugees reported that, provided the mother was intelligent and prepared to follow advice, the infants grew in a satisfactory manner. In one area it was found that the infant mortality rate among refugees compared favorably with that of the surrounding population.

The report recommends that a dietitian be appointed to stimulate education in nutrition and health at feeding centers as well as milk distributing centers. It suggests that a tomato juice plant should be established in the Jordan valley, where fruit and vegetables are cheap and abundant, as a measure to help combat deficiency in vitamins among refugees. There are estimated to be between 800,000 and 900,000 in the region.

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Problem of 'economic' refugees, those in need of food and sustenance, on the West bank of the Jordan. Code EE file 1827 (papers 1 to 16). 1952. MS Refugee Records from the General Correspondence Files of the Political Departments of the Foreign Office, Record Group 371, 1947-1970 FO 371/98516. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom